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1.0

JURISDICTION

-

The Utah Supreme Court has appellant

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2-3,
(1) and (3)(c) and (3)(i), (1990 Supp.).

Ref DOCKETING

STATEMENTS of June 4, 1990 and Dec 5, 1990.
2.0

BACKGROUND
2.1

Defendant Peterson and Pemco contracted to furnish

technology and equipment to move the Vitro tailings to Clive
Utah.
2.2

The work was a government project of the Utah State

Department of Health.
2.3

The project used defendants1 technology and equipment for

sorae three years during the period of the project without payment
to defendants for their furnished properties.
2.4

Costs to the defendants for the usage of their properties

not paid for as contracted has escalated from $1/4 million to
$16.22 million which is owing to defendants.
2.5

In the spring of 1990, defendant Peterson traveled to Clive

to check on some of his equipment there at the project site and
found it missing.

State workers there did not know of its

whereabouts.
2.6

Defendant Peterson contacted Project Mgr. Mark Day who also

did not know of its whereabouts.
2.7

Defendant Peterson expressed concern of its value, and that

others would move it from the project without his permission.
1
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2.8

Mark Day knew that Peterson was in financial difficulty

because of not being paid for his work, and that Peterson did not
have monies and ability to continue with the project's
demobilization.
2.9

Mark Day later told Peterson the location of his equipment,

and that the State had put Peterson's equipment into storage.
2.10 "On May 16, 1989, Larry F. Anderson, Director, Utah
Bureau of Radiation Control, wrote to Mr. Peterson and
PEMCO to remove the equipment within 15 days from the
storage lot at 154 East Gordon Lane, Murray, Utah."
2.11 "On May 23, 1989, Mr. Peterson responded to Mr.
Anderson's letter saying that he did not have a place
to store the equipment."

Peterson also complained of

not being paid for its usage.
2.12 "On June 5, 1989, Mr. Anderson again wrote Mr. Peterson
and PEMCO to remove the equipment by June 23, 1989."
2.14 "On August 4, 1989, Mr. Anderson wrote to Mr. Peterson
and PEMCO saying that failure to take possession of the
equipment was tantamount to abandoning the equipment,
and that the State intended to sell the equipment as
surplus property to help defray its moving and storage
costs."

see AFFIDAVIT of Mark Day, items 10-13

2.15 With each demand from the STATE the defendant wrote back
demanding payment for its usage.
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2.16

On January 26, 1990, Peterson filed a complaint in the

Third District Court (Civil No. 900900523, Judge Russon/Stirba)
complaining of not being paid and of the State's fraudulent
payment bond.

Peterson had notified the State that their bond

was defective in July of 1985.

William D. Peterson was the

plaintiff, The State of Utah, Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson, Kenneth
L. Alkema, and Peterson Van Alstein were the defendants.
3.0

NATURE OF PROCEEDING IN TRIAL COURT
3.1

On February 23, 1990 UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

(plaintiff) brought suit against WILLIAM D. PETERSON AND PEMCO
(defendant) to have defendant move his equipment from the private
property leased by Tom Wolff.
3.2

(Civil No. 900901098, Judge Young)

Interestingly, the STATE complained, for the moving of

private (equipment) property, from private property, for which
neither equipment or property the State had any rights or
arrangement. (Ref Article IV, Constitution of the United States)
3.3

In bringing suite against the defendant, the plaintiff

essentially brought suit against the defendant to continue work
on the project in the form of demobilization.
3.4

The State's statement in their BRIEF OF APPELLEE that
they filed a
"declaratory judgment action against Mr.
Peterson and his company, PEMCO, to determine whether
equipment, which was being stored at the State's
expense, should be considered abandoned"
is misleading.
The State knew that Peterson or PEMCO owned the
3
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equipment, and knew that he was in hardship from not
being paid, and that he had a demand upon the State for
payment for their having a fraudulent payment bonding,
monies rightfully owing to Peterson.

The State had no

rights to Peterson's properties per Articles IV, V, and
VII of the Constitution of the United States.
3.5

The defendant answered and counter-claimed for payment per

entitlement including:
a)

Article IV of the Constitution of The United States,
rights to be secure against unreasonable seizures.

b)

Article V of the Constitution of The United States,
shall not be deprived of property without due process.

c)

Article VII of the constitution of The United States.
Rights of trial and judgment by jury are preserved.

d)

Bonding Law Title 14, chapter 1, sections 7 and 15
Liability of State for failure to obtain payment bond.

e)

Bonding Law Title 63, chapter 56, Sec. 38
Bonds necessary when contract is awarded.

3.6

Contrary to the BRIEF OF APPELLEE, Peterson's complaint
in the case before Russon/Stirba is not the same as the
counterclaims in this matter.

3.7

The counterclaims in this matter were made before Judge
Russon; but, Judge Russon disallowed the whole of them.

3.8

The State's statements and writing in this matter
saying that the defendant's counterclaim is duplicative
of the complaint filed by Mr. Peterson is misleading
the Judges of these courts because the State failed to
4
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say that this duplicative complaint has already been
rejected, (not allowed into the Russon Court).

Judge

Russon would allow only a much simplified complaint.
3.9

For the plaintiff to say that the defendant can pursue
his counterclaim in the Judge Russon/Stirba Court is a
fraudulent lie by the State in that they know Judge
Russon has already disallowed the "duplicative
complaint".

3.10

Defendant Peterson thus MOTIONS that the State's order

motion and thus its resulting ruling ORDER OF DISMISSAL and the
State's statements in their BRIEF OF APPELLEE are misleading to
the Courts wherein they say that Peterson's counterclaim is
duplicative of the complaint "NOW PENDING" in the Judge
Russon/Stirba matter.

The State knows full well that the

duplicative complaint was disallowed by Judge Russon and not
allowed in because of the Judge's restriction of its length.
3.11

Peterson thus charges that the State has unlawfully

deceived Judge Young in obtaining his dismissal, and also the
Judges of the Supreme Court in this matter per Rule 78-51-31 and
by so doing defendant Peterson is entitled to treble damages
($48.6M) and so motions:
78-51-31 DECEIT AND COLLUSION An attorney and
counselor who is guilty of deceit or collusion, or
who consents thereto with intent to deceive a
court or judge or a party to any action or
proceeding is liable to be disbarred, and shall
forfeit to the injured party treble damages to be
5
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recovered in a civil action.
See State's BRIEF OF APPELLEE, ARGUMENT II - page i and 6 wherein
he says

DUPLICATIVE OF THE COMPLAINT NOW PENDING BEFORE THE

THIRD DISTRICT COURT", compare State's addendum A and C
(Complaint of January 26,1990) with Peterson's 10 page complaint
of (May 8, 1990)•

State's attorney knew of change, see her

ADDENDUM B, but she persisted in declaring "DUPLICATIVE COMPLAINT
IS NOW PENDING", see her comparison of complaints page 6,
paragraph center of page, where, in about 150 words she compares
the complaints, "side by side".

It is obvious that the

plaintiff's attorney is misleading the court, claiming that a
particular complaint "IS PENDING" when, in fact, she knows it is
not pending, when in fact, "THE ATTEMPTED SERVICE WAS QUASHED" of
the "DUPLICATIVE COMPLAINT", by the court, per a motion made by
the plaintiff's attorney.
3.12

The defendant sought payment for his prior work before

being required to continue working.
3.13

Note that the defendant has direct entitlement for payment

for his work done because of the State's failure to have a good
and sufficient payment bond.
Title 14, chapter 1, section 15 - Liability of state or political
subdivision failing to obtain bond* requires that:
If the state or one of its political subdivisions fails
to obtain a payment bond, it shall, upon demand by a person
who has supplied materials or performed labor under the
applicable contract, promptly make payment to that person,
6
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and the creditor shall have a direct right of action on his
account against the appropriate political entity in any
court having jurisdiction in the count in which the contract
was to be performed. The action shall be commenced within
one year after furnishing of materials or labor.
Title 14, chapter 2, section 2 - Failure to require bond - Direct
liability - Limitation of actions, requires that:
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter,
who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or
to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be personally
liable to all persons who have furnished materials or
performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value
of such materials furnished or labor performed, not
exceeding, however in any case the prices agreed upon.
Actions to recover on such liability shall be commenced
within one year from the last date the last materials were
furnished or the labor performed.
3.14

The defendant made various motions that the plaintiff

answer to defendant's counterclaim and various motions for
judgment as follows:
Motions for relief were made and denied on dates as follows:
Motion for Default Judgment - 4/12/90 ~
Denied - 5/7/90
Motion for Judgment - 4/12/90 -- Denied - 5/7/90
Motion for Judgment - 4/12/90 —
Denied - 5/7/90
Motion for Judgment for fraud - 4/12/90
3.15

—

Denied - 5/7/90

With repeated failure of the State to answer Peterson's

counterclaim and repeated denial for judgement by the Court,
Peterson appeals to the Supreme Court for a decision to reverse
Judge Young's order to demobilize, default judgments, and
variously styled motions and counterclaims, dated May 9, 1990.
(See DOCKETING STATEMENT of June 4, 1990)
3.16

Peterson's appeal was then denied in that there was not
7
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then a final order to appeal from.
3.17
4.0

The defendant was denied his counterclaims.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
4.1

THERE HAS BEEN A TRIAL COURT RULING;

The plaintiff

prevailed and obtained a judgment order against the defendant
that he do certain work of demobilization.
4.2

Per the order of the court, the defendant hired cranes,

trucks, and people, and under considerable hardship defendant
demobilized, moving hundreds of tons of equipment into storage he
had to arrange for.
4.3

With the plaintiff's successful in obtaining judgment and

the relief sought, the plaintiff motioned for dismissal of the
matter which was granted.
4.4

The plaintiff statement in his BRIEF OF APPELLEE that
"Judge young's final order presents two issues for
review. First, - voluntarily dismiss its complaint.
Second, whether Judge Young should have dismissed Mr.
Peterson's counterclaim without prejudices as
duplicative of his complaint before Judge Russon in
Civil No. 90090523."
is short cited, misleading, and deserving of judgment
against the plaintiff's attorney for misleading the
court, see 3.10 and 3.11 above.

4.5

The offer of the plaintiff to voluntary dismiss its

complaint after order, sentence, and execution of the defendant
is irrelevant, whats done is done.
4.6

The purporting that the defendant has another basis of
8
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prosecuting his counterclaim, that it is "DUPLICATIVE OF THE
COMPLAINT NOW PENDING BEFORE THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT" is a
fraudulent lie, misleading the court, wherein the plaintiff knows
that the court of Judge Russon refused to accept Peterson's
complaint, because of length and its complications.

Again

because the plaintiff's misleading of the court, the defendant
motions for judgment per 78-51-31, see 3.6 to 3.11 above.
4.7

The plaintiff State cited City of Monticello v.
Christensen - Affirmed The cited case was a criminal
matter which affirmed that "The standard rule is that
appellate jurisdiction is the authority to review the
actions or judgements of an inferior tribunal upon the
record made in that tribunal, and to affirm, modify or
reverse such action or judgment."

4.8

The plaintiff also cited State v. Rio Vista Oil,
Ltd., - Vacated and remanded wherein the State sought
a temporary restraining order, charging that Rio Vista,
a gasoline retailer in Utah, offered to sell motor fuel
below cost in Moab, Utah, and in American Fork.
Appeal and Error:
1) Supreme Court had to assume that trial judge found
his findings and conclusions to be satisfactory on all
particulars, despite inconsistency, where findings and
conclusions were signed by trial judge and were not
attacked on appeal as not representing his views.
2)
Conclusions of law are not accorded added
deference on appeal simply because they are denominated
findings of fact; Supreme Court disregards labels and
looks to substance.
3)
Lower court's statutory interpretations are
accorded no particular deference on appeal, but are
assessed for correctness, as are any other conclusions
of law.
9

APPELLANT'S REPLY/BRIEF ANSWER
Utah -vs- Peterson & PEMCO

5.0

NATURE OF THE CASE
5.1

The case involves a question of entitlement of the defendant

to be paid for his technologies and equipment provided for and
used on a government project.
5.2

In his "BRIEF OF APPELLEE" plaintiff states "case
involves a question of disposition of equipment and
defendant Peterson's counterclaim."

Peterson's

technology and equipment have partially been sold by
the State of Utah to Union Pacific's "U.S. Pollution
Co."

Other of Peterson's equipment was demobilized by

putting into storage as ordered of Peterson by the
court.

Nothing has been paid to Peterson for the

state's usage of his technologies and equipment.

They

have not been taken by due process of law, Articles V
and VII of the Constitution of the United States.
5.3

When the State of Utah complained against the defendant for

him to continue with his equipment by demobilizing, Peterson
counterclairaed for payment for the State's prior usage of his
technologies and equipment.
5.4

When the State of Utah complained against the defendant for

not having paid child support (when Peterson did not have monies
and was out of work), Peterson counterclaim for payment for the
State's prior usage of his technologies and equipment.
5.5

When the State with his wife ordered him from his home and
10

APPELLANT'S REPLY/BRIEF ANSWER
Utah -vs- Peterson & PEMCO
brought suit against him for divorce because of him not being
able to support his family, Peterson counterclaimed for payment
for the State's prior usage of his technologies and equipment.
5.6

In all, his counterclaims were ignored and not answered, and

by so, Peterson is entitled to default judgment.
6.0

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
6.1

Initially, when not paid, Peterson brought civil proceedings

in the Federal District Court against The Argee Corporation.
Attorney John P. Sampson interfered in this matter and suit was
subsequently brought against him and his clients Robert Mouritsen
and John McSweeney.

This matter is currently before the Board of

Appeals, Supreme Court No. 910079, see cover sheet reference.
Sampson has fraudulently intervened between Peterson and his
attorneys taking Peterson's assets for Mouritsen and McSweeney.
6.2

In this matter the defendant made a prior appeal the for

reversal of a prior Judge Young court's ruling order and ask for
relief for his previous costs and the additional costs of demobilization, (the costs of the courts ruling).
See DOCKETING STATEMENT of June 4, 1990
6.3

In the plaintiff's "BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE" he treats the

matter as if no judgment order was ever rendered.

After the

court ruling order against the defendant, and then after the
defendants performance per the court order, the plaintiff
motioned for and obtained dismissal.
11
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defendant was thus forced to do additional work of demobilization
without enumerations, contrary to his rights for payment and
rights of defense per Articles V and VII of the U.S.
Constitution.
7.0

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
7.1

Peterson's technologies and equipment now still at Clive and

other equipment which was stored on Gordon Lane were never sold
to either the Argee Corporation or the State of Utah since they
were not paid for per Article V of the U.S. Constitution.

These

properties were and remain the properties of Peterson even though
they were used for three years by the State and his contractor,
without payment to Peterson as noted.
7.2

The State's complaint of incurring ongoing expenses in

storing Peterson's equipment is out of order.

The stand of the

State is like unto returning a rental car and asking for storage
costs instead of paying for its usage.

The State and its

contractor did have an arrangement with Peterson to use his
technologies and equipment to move the Vitro tailings.
arrangement required payment for said usage.

The

The State or Argee

never had any arrangement with Peterson for storage of his
equipment.
8.0

Peterson has not been paid for usage of his assets.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
8.1

In the plaintiff's "BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE" he says that

there are no justiciable issues.

He is ignoring the fact that
12
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the defendant believes that he was wrongfully given judgment and
that he seeks restitution for the wrongful judgment as afforded
to him per articles IV, V, and VII of the Constitution of the
United State, wherein the government cannot take property from
him without restitution and due process of law including trial by
jury.
8.2

Restitution must include costs of demobilization.

The State entered this case on the supposition of and from

the position that they were keeper and storer of Peterson's
properties from which they demanded relief.
8.3

In reality the State with its subcontractor was a contracted

user of Peterson's technologies and equipment for which use the
State and its subcontractor are responsible to pay; and, to
obtain and hold bonding for its payment liability;

of which they

have done neither.
8.4

The defendant seeks to get this court matter in proper

perspective.
8.5

The treatment of the defendant before Judge Young was

grossly defective in its deficiencies.
8.6

In making judgment against him, the defendant's answers to

complaint were ignored by the court, (his answers being included
in his counterclaim and motions).
8.7

The plaintiff failed to answer to the defendant's

counterclaim.

At least five times the defendant demanded answers

to his counterclaim.

In some instances the plaintiff answered in
13
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motions and in some instances the plaintiff simply failed to
answer.

Record of this and conversation of this between the

plaintiff's attorney and the court is in the proceedings.
8.8

The plaintiff was crafty and deceiving in that it was able

to obtain a dismissal of the matter while avoiding answering to
the court the charges of the defendant's counterclaim.
8.9

The plaintiff has had opportunity (even in the BRIEF OF

APPELLEE) to answer the real issues and should explain the merits
of his position in taking the works of the defendant's without
payment for them.
8.10

The plaintiff's craftiness and deceit in answering has now

put it in a position of judgment whereby plaintiff claims that
there has been no finding of facts;

wherein there are no further

facts and the plaintiff has no further defense except in his
efforts to avoid the issue and seek relief solely by dismissal of
this matter from review of the Supreme Court.
9.0

ARGUMENT
9.1

The defendant is entitled to judgement solely because of the

plaintiff's failure to answer to the defendant's complaint.
9.2

The defendant also is entitled to judgment on the basis of

merits of his complaint.

Copies of the bogus bonding documents

of the plaintiff are presented.

The plaintiff's complaint of not

completing de-mobilization evidences the work and technology.
9.3

The court failed to recognize the defendants rights and the
14
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plaintiff's failure to answer to the defendant's complaint.
ARGUMENT
I.

9.4

THERE ARE JUSTICIABLE ISSUES REMAINING IN THE
DEFENDANTS' COUNTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST THE
STATE AND, THE STATE FRAUDULENTLY DECEIVED
THE COURT PURPORTING A LIE (78-51-31), THE
COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE MATTER IS BASED UPON
A FALSE REPRESENTATION MADE BY THE ATTORNEY
FOR THE PLAINTIFF. THE SUPREME COURT MUST
REVIEW THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY
AND RULING OF THE COURT IN VIEW OF CORRECT
INFORMATION. FURTHERMORE, THE ISSUE IS NOT
WHETHER PETERSON SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
STORAGE OF SAID EQUIPMENT, THE ISSUE IS THAT
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE PAID FOR THE
GOVERNMENTS'S USAGE OF SAID EQUIPMENT.

At issue is the State's requirement that the defendant

continue work without payment for the previous work and without
payment for the work immediately demanded; or contrarily, i.e.
that the defendant shall be paid for his costs of providing said
work.
9.5

The matter is now further complicated with additional monies

owing to the defendant for his work in that the defendant has now
accomplished the additional work of demobilization as sought by
the complaint of the plaintiff.
9.6

The plaintiff states that "there no justiciable issues", and

that "this issue has been resolved".

This is true only in that

the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant and the
defendant paid and performed according to the order of the court.
9.7

The defendant rightfully appeals this mater seeking relief

from the order of the court and associated counterclaims for

15
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costs of the judgment made against the defendant associated with
the defendants constitutional rights and rights per state law as
indicated.
9.8

Contrary to plaintiff claims, evidence of Peterson's claims

were introduced into the lower court and the Supreme Court has
record of this in Peterson's brief and Peterson's previously
filed referenced papers.
9.9

On bottom of page 5 of appellee's brief, the plaintiff

states that:
a)

"The controversy arising from the State's complaint

against Mr. Peterson and PEMCO is final"
b)

"A judgment is final when it ends the controversy

between the parties litigant."
9.10

Per his rightful entitlement, the defendant has appealed

for relief and costs of Judge Young's ruling against the
defendant.
9.11

The plaintiff has referred to another court matter of

Peterson's before Judge Russon/Stirba.

In comparison:

a)

The contending parties in this matter are different.

b)

The complaint of the state requiring additional work of
demobilization is not an issue in the R/S matter.

c)

There is no reason to expect that issues of the
immediate matter (ruling order of Judge Young) should
become issues in the Court of Judge Russon/Stirba.
16
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d)

Additional matters including the misrepresentation of
the plaintiff's attorney and the failing of the
plaintiff's attorney to answer the defendants complaint
are issues in the immediate case requiring review.
Wherein, these matters cannot be transferred to another
matter (R/S case).

Judge Young's final order should be upheld and the
plaintiff's appeal should be prosecuted by the Supreme Court.
9.12

The merits of the ruling order of Judge Young are

rightfully appealed herein.
9.13

If the issues of matter in the ruling order of Judge Young

should rightfully be instead in the matter of Judge
Russon/Stirba, the plaintiff was out of order in bringing the
issue into the court of Judge Young, in the first place.
9.14

The plaintiff's statement in II. on page 6 "THERE HAS BEEN

NO TRIAL COURT RULING ON THE MERITS OF THE COUNTERCLAIM" is
conflictive with fact, and with his statement in his CONCLUSION
on page 8 wherein he writes of "the trial court's order granting
the State's motion to voluntarily dismiss its complaint and
dismissing Mr. Peterson's counterclaim against the State without
prejudice."
9.15

There has been a ruling on the merits of Peterson's

counterclaim, his counterclaim was dismissed.
9.16

In his appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant is
17
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rightfully entitled to the review of the merits of his counterclaim and its decision of dismissal by the trial court, according
to the evidence of fact contained therein.
9.17

On page 7, line 19, the plaintiff writes of it being

inequitable to defend the same action in two different lawsuits.
Note that the defendant in seeking a fair treatment, has so far
had to bring in this issue into six state courts and three
federal courts - nine trial courts in all.

This matter can

rightfully, justly, and most speedily be determined in this
proper appeal per Rule 1(a) as Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
specifies.
9.18

Otherwise, this matter will be appealed to the federal

courts of the United States, even appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States in order to obtain an equitable trial and
payment for properties taken for government use per the rights of
the defendant per the Constitutions of the United States.
9.19

The issues before the Supreme courts are the review of

judgements of the trial court, not the matter's dismissal as the
plaintiff wishes were the focus.
9.20

The review before the Supreme Court is the review of trial

matter presented in proceedings.

It is not the review and

complaint of matter not present as the plaintiff complain's
wherein anything missing is his deficiency.
9.21 Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton was cited; wherein, a
city brought suit against landowners, seeking an
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injunction to compel removal of a fence, compensatory
and punitive damages. The District Court ruled in
favor of the city on its claim for injunctive relief,
reserving ruling on the damage claims and the
landowners claims; the landowners appealed. The appeal
was dismissed in that the trial court's ruling was not
a final judgment for purposes of appeal.
9.22

Court Judge Young did not reserve ruling, judgment was
final, a dismissal now of the appeal is out of order.
9.23 Kennedy v. New Era Industries was cited; wherein
judgment "imposing sanctions" for failure to respond
adequately to interrogatories was not final for
purposes of appeal where such judgment did not dispose
of all parties and issues in litigation.

9.24

Court Judge Young did not impose sanctions, plaintiff's
failure to answer to defendant's counterclaim was not error,
or accident or misstatement, but simply unexcusable failure.
9.25 Within Kennedy v. New Era Industries was cited Rule
75(h) which provides: That if anything material to
either party is omitted from the record on appeal by
error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties
by stipulation, or the district court, either before or
after the record is transmitted to the Supreme Court,
... on a proper suggestion or of its own initiative,
may direct that the omission or misstatement shall be
corrected, and if necessary that a supplemental record
shall be certified and transmitted by the clerk of the
district court.

9.26

Of his own initiative, the defendant has included a

different complaint and interrogatories and their respective
answers.

What is made apparent is that the State basically does

not have answers to Peterson's counter-complaint but purports
that its documents speak for themselves and its posture requires
judgments of law, i.e. the plaintiff State has no information to
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add.
9.27 Pilcher v. State Department of Social Services was
cited. saying - matters not admitted in evidence
before trier of fact will not be considered on appeal
before Supreme Court.
9.28

By his counterclaim, defendant introduced the matter that

he has not been paid fo.r his previous work, that he has
entitlement to be paid for his cost because the plaintiffs bond
was defective, and that he has rights of keeping his corporate
filings in Utah Division of Corporate Registrations.

These

admitted matters have entitlement to be considered on this appeal
before the Supreme Court.
9.29

In answer to interrogatories on these matters, the State's

representatives say the bonding laws, the Vitro contract bonding
documents, and Peterson company's corporation file documents
speak for themselves and that determination of these matters is a
matter of determination of law.

Of these matters, it is now

appropriate for a determination law by the Supreme Court.
9.30

The plaintiff has had further opportunities and

requirements to answer.

By his answers before Judge Russon, the

plaintiff has nothing to add to the matter in Judge Young.

By

the State's record in Judge Russon, matters must now be
determined by judgments of Law, appropriately, the Supreme Court.
10.0

ADDENDUM COMPLAINT
10.1 R C Tolman Const. Co., v. Myton Water Ass'n, was cited;
wherein a construction company appealed a District
Court decision to withhold monies for damages because
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plaintiff overran contracted time period. The Supreme
Court affirmed findings noting the presumption of
validity and correctness of the judgment of the trial
court; and require plaintiff to sustain the burden of
showing error.
10.2

The plaintiff has shown its error, in its fraudulently

purporting the existence of a duplicate pending complaint in
another matter, when, in fact, the service of the purported
complaint was "QUASHED by the plaintiff".

The plaintiff has

clearly shown that it fraudulently misled the trial court in its
obtaining ruling and dismissal in its BRIEF OF APPELLEE court
order of 7 May 1990 clearly rules out the "DUPLICATIVE NOW
PENDING COMPLAINT" conjecture of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff

has shown no basis for continuing this matter in the court of
Judge Russon/Stirba, but just the opposite.

The plaintiff has

made the cases distinctly different by fraudulently purporting
"DUPLICATIVE PENDING COMPLAINTS" and by their demonstrated deceit
in the court, another parties to the matter are brought in attorneys R. Paul Van Dam, Brent A. Burnett, Denise Chancellor,
and Richard K.Rathburn.
11.0

MOTION
11.1

The plaintiff State obtained dismissal in the Court of

Judge Young on the basis that PETERSON'S COUNTERCLAIM IS
DUPLICATIVE OF THE COMPLAINT NOW PENDING BEFORE THE COURT OF
JUDGE RUSSON/STIRBA.
11.2

The plaintiff State is making the same representation of
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DUPLICATIVE COMPLAINT IS NOW PENDING before the Supreme Court.
11.3

In the plaintiffs BRIEF OF APPELLEE, the plaintiff further

made a comparison "side by side" of the defendant's counterclaim
and a complaint, the same complaint quashed (not allowed by the
plaintiffs motion) in the pending matter - court of Judge
Russon/Stirba.
11.4

By her own submissions, (ADDENDUM B - BRIEF OF APPELLEE)

the attorney for the plaintiff has deceived the court of Judge
Young, and is attempting to likewise deceive the judges of the
Supreme Court, by claiming that a complaint of Peterson's is NOW
PENDING; when, in fact, the plaintiff's attorney had the service
of it QUASHED 1i i
11.5

Note further that the plaintiffs attorney knows which

complaint is pending in the Russon/Stirba matter in that she
answered the complaint.
11.6

The defendant motions that the court find that the

plaintiffs attornies have unlawfully deceived judges of the
court per Rule 78-51-31 and by doing so defendant Peterson is
entitled to treble damages ($48.6M), for which he so motions.
12.0

SUMMARY
12.1

The State legislated law seems to have intent consistent

with the intent of constitutional requirement Article V wherein
an individual should be paid for his property taken and used for
public use.

The actions of the State's employees and the State's
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court appear to be just the opposite, wherein their every
efforts, even unlawful, are to deprive the individual of payment,
even seizing his properties and preventing hira from a fair jury
trial, which rights Peterson has by Articles IV and VII of the
Constitution.
12.2

Peterson's contribution to moving the Vitro Tailing were

very substantial, wherein his engineering prescribed and made
possible its movement by the railroad.

This in spite of the

tailing wetness problem, information of this being withheld by
the State, and Peterson becoming the fall guy for the State's
misrepresentation problems.
12.3

On a $50M project, $16.2M for his engineering, proprietary

technology, and his equipment is not unreasonable.

Since

Peterson solely devised and made the working and the solving of
the problem job possible, even being done in 2/3 of the allotted
time, even $48.6M is justifiable.

The court should rightfully

award defendant treble his cost in this matter as prescribed by
Constitutional and State laws.
13.0

SIGNATURE
Dated this

'<.

day of July, 1991.
William D. Peterson, pro se
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14.0

MAILING CERTIFICATE
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
This is to certify that 4 (four) true and correct copies of
the fore going
REPLY/BRIEF APPEAL, with ADDENDUM
COMPLAINT AND MOTION
are being delivered at the
office of the Attorney General, State Capital building in Salt
Lake City, Utah, per rule 5 (b)l and rule 4 (e)(9), in an
envelope addressed to:
R. PAUL VAN DAM - #3312 Attorney General
BRENT A. BURNETT - #4004 Assistant Attorney General
DENISE CHANCELLOR, USB #5452 Assistant Attorney General
RICHARD K. RATHBURN, USB #5183 Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone:
(801) 538-1017
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Dated this

lZ-

st day of July, 1991.

.

\ \ / *•

Dfr&~~—-^

William D. Peterson

15.0

ADDENDUM

15.1
15.2
15.3
15.4
15.5
15.6
15.7
15.8

AFFIDAVIT of Mark S. Day, State of Utah - Vitro Project Mgr.
DOCKETING STATEMENT - Appeal from Judge Young orders June 4, 1990
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Appeal from Judge Young orders May 22, 1990
ORDER - Order of Judge Young appealed from May 9, 1990
COMPLAINT - filed in the court of Judge Russon, May 1990
ANSWERS - to complaint in the court of Judge Russon, June 6, 1990
INTERROGATORIES - Peterson's questions to State personnel
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES - Answers from State personnel
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STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

AFFIDAVIT

£

Mark S. Day, after first being duly sworn on oath,

z.
3

deposes and says:
1.

^

I am employed by the Utah Bureau of Radiation

Control, Utah Department of Health, as Project Manager of the

-3
K_

Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Projects and am responsible
for administration of the Vitro tailings removal project at
Clive, Utah.
2.

Part of my responsibilities as Project Manager

were/are planing and design, bidding and procurement,
construction management, and completion and monitoring of the
Vitro tailings removal project.
3.

PEMCO and William D. Peterson contracted with the

State's contractor, Argee Corporation, to catch and stack the.
Vitro tailings after Argee Corporation off-loaded the tailings
from railroad cars when they arrived at the Clive^ite.
4.

<^-bdtQ

As a result of a contract dispute between P^MCO

and Argee Corporation, the.equipment to whicn William D. Peterson
and/or PEMCO claim ownership, after being in service for a short
time, was no longer used for moving the tailings and was
dismantled from the tailings site in approximately July 1985.

N

5.

The equipment was moved to a nearby area, which

w

was then owned by the State, because it interfered with Argee

y

Corporation's operations.
6.

Approximately two years later (1987) the Clive

tj

property where the equipment was located was sold by the State

Op"

and the new owner requested that the equipment be moved from his
property.

p
7.

The State had difficulty in locating Mr. Peterson

3

but eventually found him and gave him verbal notices to remove
the equipment from the property the State had sold.
8.
Neither Mr. Peterson nor PEMCO removed the

^_

equipment from the privately-owned Clive property.

K

9.

In approximately February or March 1989 the last

State contractor at the Vitro site, Wolff Excavating, was demobilizing the site and the State requested that Wolff Excavating
move the equipment to its storage lot in Murray, Utah as the
owner of the Clive property wanted his property cleared.
10.

On May 16, 1989 Larry F. Anderson, Director, Utah

Bureau of Radiation Control, wrote to Mr. Peterson and PEMCO to
remove the equipment within 15 days from the storage lot at 154
East Gordon Lane, Murray, Utah.
11.

On May 23, 1989 Mr. Peterson responded to Mr.

Anderson's letter saying that he did not have a place to store
the equipment.

-2-

12.

On June 5, 1989 Mr. Anderson again wrote the Mr.

Peterson and PEMCO to remove the equipment by June 23, 1989.
13.

On August 4, 1989 Mr. Anderson wrote to Mr.

Peterson and PEMCO stating that failure to take possession of the
equipment was tantamount to abandoning the equipment and that the
State intended to sell the equipment as surplus property to help
defray its moving and storage costs.
14.

To date Mr. Peterson or PEMCO have not moved the

equipment and the State is incurring a $200 per month expense for
storage of the equipment.
DATED this

*~>

day of

AP£11—

1990.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3'*

'^Qlk

day of

, 1990.

NOTARY PUBLIC

c,

Residing at £f<5%'Q^CI^J^<_

-3-

<-'

sy
C^-^JC.

William D. Peterson II
Telephone (801) 485-9011
c/o Paul E. Peterson
1444 Murphy's Lane
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone (801) 278-3435

June 4, 1990.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, STATE OF UTAH
Utah State Department
of Health
Plaintiff,
-vsWilliam D. Peterson & PEMCO
Defendants, Petitioner

]
]
)
i
]
i
)
}
i

DOCKETING STATEMENT
Supreme Court No.

*5&Q£&2~*

Appealed from
Third District Court
Civil No. 900901098
Judge David S. Young
Relating Supreme Court No. 900215

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the appellant files this docketing
statement.
1.
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred on this
court by Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec 78-2-2, subsections (1)
and (3)(c).
2.
This appeal is from an order entered May 9, 1990 by
Judge David S. Young in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The case was originally
filed on February 23, 1990.
Motions for relief were made and denied on dates as follows:
Motion
Motion
Motion
Motion

for
for
for
for

Default Judgment - 4/12/90 —
Denied - 5/7/90
Judgment - 4/12/90 —
Denied - 5/7/90
Judgment - 4/12/90 —
Denied - 5/7/90
Judgment for fraud - 4/12/90 —
Denied - 5/7/90

3.
The order appealed was entered on the 12st day of May,
1990. A notice of appeal was filed in the clerk's office of the
lower court on 22th day of May, 1990, service of motion under
rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59.
4.

The facts as to what happened are as follows:

4-1. The appeal on May 22th of the above named defendant is from
that judgment entered by the above entitled court on the 12st day
of May, 1990 and from the whole thereof. In all, relief from the

' - > *

matter has been ask for in nine motions. This appeal is taken
from the Third Judicial Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
and is taken to the court of Appeals. Defendant is now situated
in this matter where judgment has been made upon him without
support of law wherein defendant is entitled to the benefits of
judgment as a matter of law: Title 14f chapter 1, section 7 and
15 - Liability of State for failure to obtain payment bond, Title
63, chapter 56, Sec. 38 - Bonds necessary when contract is
awarded, and Article V of the Constitution of the United States
which requires that private property cannot be taken for public
use without just compensation. Defendant is entitled as a matter
of law and stands denied judgment without reason of law.
4-2. In 1985, the defendant in his capacity of a professional
engineer furnished designs used for three years for the railroad
dumping and transporting of the vitro tailings in Utahfs west
desert. Likewise, defendant in his capacity of owning equipment
furnished equipment for rail car dumping and material
transporting. Plaintiff through his contractor the Argee
Corporation used defendant's design and equipment for some three
years for moving the entire vitro tailings.
Defendant's company PEMCO originally contracted the vitro
equipment work. Shortly after starting, plaintiffs contractor
breached agreement by not making payment as contracted. Without
payment, Pemco could not continue operating and the Argee-Pemco
contract became void. After the breach, defendant personally
contracted with Argeefs manager Jack Adams to complete the work,
and furthermore did completed work.
Defendant should be paid for usage of his designs, equipment
and labor, and to continue supplying to plaintiff to demobilize.
Defendant gave notice to the State that their project did not
have a good and sufficient payment bond, that defendant was not
being paid, and that litigation would result. When defendant was
seeking payment in July of 1985, the State did not have a good
and sufficient payment bond applicable to this their project.
The project documents stated voiding requirements of a good and
sufficient payment bond - (see voiding disclaimer).
Title 63, chapter 56, Sec. 38. requires that bonds necessary
when contract is awarded. A representation of a bond was made
and used. The representation was fraudulent. Defendant
complained to the State for recourse because of the State's not
having a good and sufficient payment bond. The State is liable
to pay defendant by law because of their not having a good and
sufficient payment bond as required per Title 14, chapter 1, Sec.
7. Liability of public body for failure to obtain payment bond.
The State is also liable to pay defendant by law per Title
14, chapter 1, Sec. 15. Liability of state or political
subdivision failing to obtain bond. Plaintiff told defendant
that before defendant could obtain recourse of payment from
plaintiff, defendant must seek recourse from plaintiff's

contractor through legal channels of courts. Defendant followed
plaintiffs instructions, doing as plaintiff instructed. Owner's
attorney and engineer fraudulently instructed defendant to seek
recourse from the Argee Corporation stating that they were not
liable until defendant exhausted that recourse. But, by law the
owner (State of Utah) was liable and their statements to
defendant were fraudulent and misguiding to avoid the owner's
responsibilities. The plaintiff owner is liable to the plaintiff
for damages for their fraudulent misguidance and
misrepresentations when defendant sought for payment.
This demand is proper and timely now in that the defendant
contracted in writing, open ended, with Garth Wilson, to write of
these problems to seek monies required to pay for costs of work.
Plaintiff was rightfully in requirement to pay costs of
defendant's work when their contractor breached his obligation,
said requirement is in writing by the original "Project Manual".
CONTRACT pg 1-35, par 4: "In consideration of the foregoing
premises, the Department agrees to pay to Contractor in the
manner and in the amount provided in the said specifications
and proposal."
The PERFORMANCE BOND section of the State's Vitro Project
Manual cites (Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953
further stating:
"and all liabilities on this bond shall be determined in
accordance with said provisions to the same extent as if it
were copied at length herein."
Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 requires that
if a subcontractor is not adequately paid by the general
contractor which he is working for, then the State is obligated
to pay the subcontractor for his costs of doing work. Note: The
repealing of a section of law does not void its usage as wordage,
definition, description and requirement, which the State used.
Furthermore, the project "BOND" documents specifically
exempt Argee from requirements of payment bonding and paying
their subcontractors.
"NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such
that if the said Principal shall faithfully perform the
contract in accordance with the plans, specifications, and
conditions thereof, then this obligation shall be void:
otherwise to remain in full force and effect."
When this was brought to plaintiffs attention by defendant,
plaintiff said that they errored in their contracting with Argee.
Later, effective 15th of August 1985, the Plaintiff changed his
contract document "PAYMENT BOND" section. Changes to the
contract document on the 15th of August 1985 was done so as to
have a good and sufficient payment bond. The effective date of

the good and sufficient "PAYMENT BOND" in the contract began
August 1985f nearly a month after defendant provided his initial
work. No good and sufficient "PAYMENT BOND" was effective during
when defendant was doing his initial workf for which he needs
payment. Payment bonding requirement provisions were added to
the "Project Contract" on August 15, 1989 after defendant brought
notice of plaintiffs deficiency to them.
The "PROJECT MANUAL" contract documents effective during
when defendant was doing his work required that plaintiff pay for
work of defendant if plaintiff's contractor failed to make
payment which is the condition. When defendant complained to
plaintiffs, plaintiffs instructed defendant to first seek payment
from Argee through processes of the courts. According to
plaintiffs instructions/ defendant sought payment through the
processes of the courts.
While seeking paymentf defendant was blamed for problems
associated with the material being wetf not dryable. The
dryabality problems were not known by defendant, but known by
plaintiff, this but information was withheld by defendant. The
owner failed to inform its contractor Argee Corp or its engineer
Peterson of owner's knowledge of the different conditions.
Defendant was wrongfully held liable for the information had only
by the owner and withheld by the owner. Conditions that were
encountered differed materially from those indicated, which
engineer relied upon to his detriment, thus engineer Peterson is
entitled to recover because the contract documents misrepresented
conditions that would be encountered. Entitlement is based upon
referenced law. The defendant was defamed in his industry and
family, and still not paid. The plaintiff owner is responsible
to the defendant for his costs, losses, and damages for their
withholding of information.
If plaintiffs claim this action by the defendant is not
timely, then plaintiffs instruction to the defendant were
fraudulent. According to law, defendant has properly notified
plaintiff of his dilemma and losses giving "notice of claim."
The court in the "STATE OF UTAH OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICE"
is a "court having jurisdiction in the county in which the
contract was performed and executed" per 14-1-7 and 14-1-15.
Defendant made a proper claim and action in a court having
jurisdiction in the county where defendant's labors (his
technologies) and his equipment was being used. Plaintiffs are
liable to defendant by default for their failure to answer.
The Peterson's family income had been only around $7,000 per
year because of their business being crippled from not being paid
for its work, thus they became vulnerable from outsiders.
Evidently with a call from an attorney John P. Sampson and by his
supposed letter, Sampson apparently persuaded State attorney
Peter Van Alstein to disallow or remove previous filings of the
board of directors of current record, which directors were of

record of the initial filing of Peterson's corporation. The
effect of Sampson's actions were to take control of defendant's
business and give control to Sampson's clients Robert Mouritsen
and John McSweeney who have repeatedly and fraudulently filed as
officers and directors over the filing of Peterson and his
lawfully initially registered directors to steal Peterson's and
His family's business and properties.
Attorney John P. Sampson's in affidavit fraudulently claims
to be attorney and representative for Riverside Machine and
Fabrication (MAC Industries) back in June of 1986 and since. In
contradiction, in the court of Judge John Rokich in affidavit
attorney John P. Sampson states that he has never been attorney
for Peterson or any of his businesses. Attorney Van Alstein for
the State of Utah told Peterson that anyone at anytime can come
to his division and file themselves as officers and directors of
any corporation on file in the state of Utah. State Attorney Van
Alstein has no basis for removing filed documents. The
plaintiff's operation of his Corporations and Commercial Code
Division allowed the invasion of others into and over defendant's
business. The plaintiff's attorney Peter Van Alstein intervened
and canceled defendant's proper and lawful filings of his
business posturing his company for a fraudulent takeover
allowable and possible because of unlawful actions and bad
operation code of the plaintiff's (The State of Utah).
The plaintiff is thus liable to the defendant for his
overturned taking of his business and properties, property he was
deprived of, without due process of law guaranteed to him by
ARTICLE V of the Constitution and taken without the right of
trial jury preserved to him by ARTICLE VII of the Constitution.
Attorney Van Alstein further stated that he would welcome a law
suite in this matter to obtain decisions of how to deal with this
perpetual problem relating to paper thievery of Utah
Corporations.
5.

The issues are:

5-1. Is the defendant entitled to payment for cost in providing
his property for public use.
5-1. Is the defendant entitled to payment for cost in providing
for a public project which requires by law payment bonding and
the contract bonding documents were deficient, fraudulent,
misrepresenting, and not proper and timely.
5-2. Is the defendant entitled to make keep instated filings in
the State's division of Corporations. Can the State remove
defendant's filings allowing filing over him and theft of his

a)

entitlement according to Article V of the Constitu.

the United States.
b)
Title 14, chapter 1, section 7 and 15 - Liability of State
for failure to obtain payment bond
c)
Title 63, chapter 56, Sec. 38 - Bonds necessary when
contract is awarded.
7.
There is one prior appeal related to this one, now
before this Court, an appeal No. 900215 of the Judgment of Judge
John Rokich in case # 50-265-1148 dated the 17th day of April
1990 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah is appealed to this Supreme Court. This
case relates in that this matter was also in the hands of
representation of attorney John Sampson who mishandled it badly.
Sampson's handling had an appearance of compromise and of washing
matters under the table to rid Peterson to allow Sampson's other
clients to take and steal Peterson's business from him.
8.
a)
b)
c)

Attachments:

Copies of the judgment of 5/12/90 appealed.
No findings of the court were given.
Notice of appeal - 5/22/90.
Motions denied, Judgment requested

d)
e)
f)
g)

Motion for Judgment per Article V of Constitution
of the United States - originally filed 4-12-90.
Motion for Judgment per Utah law Title 14, chapter 1
sections 7 & 15 - originally filed 4-12-90.
Motion for Judgment per Utah law Title 14, chapter 1,
sections 7 & 15 - originally filed 4-12-90.
Motion for Judgment for Fraud - originally filed 4-12-90.
Motion related to Supreme Court Case No. 900215

h)

Motion for Reinstatement of Documents filed in
Division of Corporations.
Dated this

^

day of June, 1990.

William D. Peterson, pre se

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the fore
going
DOCKETING STATEMENT
are being delivered at the office
of the Attorney General, State Capital building in Salt Lake
City, Utah, per rule 5 (b)l and rule 4 (e)(9), in an envelope
addressed to:
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312
Attorney General
BRENT A. BURNETT - 4004
Assistant Attorney General
DENISE CHANCELLOR, USB #5452
Assistant Attorney General
RICHARD K. RATHBURN, USB #5183
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone:
(801) 538-1017
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Dated this _ _ _ _ t h day of June, 1990.
William D. Peterson

v/

State o-f Utah ^ 5 . U'm Fe ter son
Apr i 1 24, 1 ^ 0
Ma-- 22, 19 c 0

l-i i 11 i am D . Fe tens on
c'o Paul E. Peterson
1444 Murphy'= Lane
Salt Lake City, Utah 8*1106
Telephone CSG1^273-343 5, 4S5-*011
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IrJ THE THIFD JUDICIAL DISTFICT COUPT IN *-ND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Utah State Department of Health
Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF A F P E M L

-k'S-

C1"i1 No. ^00901098
Nilliam D. Peterson & PEMCO
-

Judge David S. Nrouna

Defendants

TO THE CLEPK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
Y'ou will please take notice that the above named Pirst Far tv
Defendant appeals from that judgment entered bv the abo'»e
entitled court on the 9th d^y
thereof.

This appeal

of Ma/, 1990 and from the whole

is taken from the Third Judicial Court of

Salt Lake Counts, State of Utah and is taken to the court of
Appeals (The Utah Supreme Court;.
Appeal

A Petition for

and a motion for judgment will follow.

Dated this _f_

ds/ o-f Ms> , 19*0.

William D. Peterson, Defendant

Interlocutor/

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
DENISE CHANCELLOR, USB # 5452
Assistant Attorney General
RICHARD K. RATHBUN, USB #5183
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1017
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

WILLIAM D. PETERSON AND PEMCO

:

ORDER
Civil No. 900901098
Judge David S. YOUNG

Defendants.

:

The above captioned matter came before the Court,
Honorable David S. Young presiding, on May 7, 1990, for hearing
on Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause. The Defendant also raised a
motion for default judgment and other associated motions
appearing in Defendants' Answer and Counter Claim*
William D. Peterson appeared pro se, stating that he
would proceed without counsel. The Plaintiff was represented by
Denise Chancellor and Brent Burnett, Assistant Attorneys General.
The Court, having heard the arguments from Mr. Peterson
and from counsel for the Plaintiff, and having reviewed the

record before it, nowf for good cause appearing, enters the
following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants have 30 days,
without extension, to remove the equipment described in
Plaintiff's complaint and located at 154 E. Gordon Lane, Murray,
Utah.

If all the equipment is not removed on or before 5:00 p.m.

Friday, June 8, 1990 then the equipment will be deemed forfeited
to the State and may be sold as abandoned property under the
State Surplus Property statute. All proceeds from the sele of
the abandoned property may be applied to liquidate the State's
storage, transportation and other costs associated with moving
and storing the said equipment, with any remaining funds remitted
to Mr. Peterson.

If the Defendants remove the equipment within

30 days then the State must bring a separate civil action in
order to recoup expenses it incurred in the moving and storage of
the equipment.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED the Defendants' Motion for Default
Judgment and other variously styled motions appended to
Defendants' Answer and Counter Claim are hereby denied.
Dated this ^ ^ ^ day of May, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

l$r~/--

JUDGE DAVKTS. YOUNG
Third D i ^ t r i d t Cbtttt
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William D. Peterson
c/o Paul E. Peterson
1444 Murphy's Lane
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone (801)278-3435, 485-9011
file: \legal\state\NewComp.ans
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
William D. Peterson
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT
-vsThe State of Utah
Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson
Kenneth Lt Alk@!M
Peter Van Alstein
Defendants

amended from previous
filing of 26th Jan 1990
Civil No. 900900523
Judge Leonard H. Russon

r

This action is brought pursuant to authority given by Title
14, chapter 1, Section 7 and Section 15, Liability of state or
failure to obtain payment bond. Also, liability of the government
to pay just compensation for property taken and used as provided by
law of the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ARTICLE V.
I
1.
Plaintiff is an individual presently having residence at 1444
Murphy's Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106.
Chancellor - Admitted
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
2.
Plaintiff in his capacity of a professional engineer furnished
designs used for three years for the railroad dumping and
transporting of the vitro tailings in Utah's west desert; and,
plaintiff did also do and provide many types of labor.
C - without knowledge, denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
3.
Likewise, plaintiff in his capacity of owning equipment
furnished equipment for rail car dumping and mat'l transporting.
C - Without knowledge, denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
4.
Defendant through his contractor the Argee Corporation used
plaintiff's design and equipment for some three years for moving
the entire vitro tailings.
C - denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
1
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II
5.
Defendants Day and Alkema reside at the State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH at 288 North
1460 West, P.O. Box 16690 Salt Lake City, Utah 16690-0690.
Their attorney, defendant Fred Nelson is a staff attorney of the
Utah Attorney General's office at the State Capital Building,
County of Salt Lake. Peter Van Alstein is the Director of
Divisions of Corporations and Commercial Code in the Wells Bldg at
160 E 3rd South in Salt Lake] City.
C - admitted,
Hubbell - admits
ALLEGATIONS AND COMPLAINTS
6.
Plaintiff's company PEMCO originally contracted the vitro
equipment work.
C - Without knowledge, denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
7.
Shortly after starting, defendants contractor breached
agreement by not making payment as contracted.
C - Without knowledge, denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
8.
Without payment, Pemco could not continue operating and the
Argee-Pemco contract became void.
C - Without knowledge, denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
9.
After the breach, plaintiff personally contracted with Argee's
manager Jack Adams to complete the work, and furthermore did
completed work.
C - Without knowledge, denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
10. Plaintiff should be paid for usage of his designs, equipment
and labor, and to continue supplying to defendant to demobilize.
C - denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
11. Plaintiff gave notice to the State that their project did not
have a good and sufficient payment bond, that plaintiff was not
being paid, and that litigation would result.
C - denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
12. When plaintiff was seeking payment in July of 1985, the State
did not have a good and sufficient payment bond applicable to this
their project.
C - denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
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13. The project documents stated voiding requirements of a good
and sufficient payment bond - (see voiding disclaimer).
C - documents speak for themselves, denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
14. Title 63, chapter 56, Sec. 38. requires that bonds necessary
when contract is awarded.
C - Code speaks for itself, denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
15.

A representation of a bond was made and used.
C - without knowledge, therefore denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied

16.

The representation was fraudulent.
C - denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied

17. Plaintiff complained to the State for recourse because of the
State's not having a good and sufficient payment bond.
C - admit plaintiff complained, deny bond not good & suf.
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
18. The State is liable to pay plaintiff by law because of their
not having a good and sufficient payment bond as required per Title
14, chapter 1, Sec. 7. Liability of public body for failure to
obtain payment bond.
C - denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
19. The State is also liable to pay plaintiff by law per Title 14,
chapter 1, Sec. 15. Liability of state or political subdivision
failing to obtain bond*
C - denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
20. Defendant told plaintiff that before plaintiff could obtain
recourse of payment from defendant, plaintiff must seek recourse
from defendant's contractor through legal channels of courts.
C - denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
21. Plaintiff followed defendants instructions, doing as defendant
instructed.
C - without knowledge, denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
22. Owner's representatives fraudulently instructed plaintiff to
seek recourse from the Argee Corporation stating that they were not

Peterson vs State of Utah
May 8, 1990
liable until plaintiff exhausted that recourse,
C - without knowledge, denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
23. But, by law the owner (State of Utah) was liable and their
statements to plaintiff were fraudulent and misguiding to avoid the
owner f s responsibilities.
C - denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
24. The defendant owner is liable to the defendant for damages for
their fraudulent misguidance and misrepresentations when plaintiff
sought for payment.
C - denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
25. This demand is proper and timely now in that the plaintiff
contracted in writing, open ended, with Garth Wilson, to write of
these problems to seek monies required to pay for costs of work.
C - denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
26. Defendant was rightfully in requirement to pay costs of
plaintiff's work when their contractor breached his obligation,
said requirement is in writing by the original "Project Manual".
CONTRACT pg 1-35, par 4: "In consideration of the foregoing
premises, the Department agrees to pay to Contractor in the
manner and in the amount provided in the said specifications
and proposal."
C - denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
27. The PERFORMANCE BOND section of the State's Vitro Project
Manual cites (Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953
further stating:
"and all liabilities on this bond shall be determined in
accordance with said provisions to the same extent as if it
were copied at length herein."
C - bond speaks for itself, denied
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
28. Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 requires that
if a subcontractor is not adequately paid by the general
contractor which he is working for, then the State is obligated
to pay the subcontractor for his costs of doing work.
Note: The repealing of a section of law does not void its usage
as wordage, definition, description and requirement, which the
State used.
C - Title speaks for itself, denied
D - denies, no relation to Van Alstyne
4
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29. Furthermore, the project "BOND" documents specifically
exempt Argee from requirements of payment bonding and paying
their subcontractors.
"NOWf THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such
that if the said Principal shall faithfully perform the
contract in accordance with the plans, specifications, and
conditions thereof, then this obligation shall be void:
otherwise to remain in full force and effect."
C - denied
D - denies, no relation to Van Alstyne
30. When this was brought to defendants attention by plaintiff,
defendant said that they errored in their contracting with Argee.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
31. Later, effective 15th of August 1985, the Defendant changed
his contract document "PAYMENT BOND" section.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
32. Changes to the contract document on the 15th of August 1985
was done so as to have a good and sufficient payment bond.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
33. The effective date of the good and sufficient "PAYMENT BOND"
in the contract began August 1985, nearly a month after plaintiff
provided his initial work.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
34. No good and sufficient "PAYMENT BOND" was effective during
when plaintiff was doing his initial work, for which he needs
payment.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
35. Payment bonding requirement provisions were added to the
"Project Contract" on August 15, 1989 after plaintiff brought
notice of defendants deficiency to them.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
36. The "PROJECT MANUAL" contract documents effective during
when plaintiff was doing his work required that defendant pay for
work of plaintiff if defendant's contractor failed to make
payment which is the condition.
C - manual speaks for itself, denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
5
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37• When plaintiff complained to defendants, defendants
instructed plaintiff to first seek payment from Argee through
processes of the courts,
C - denied, but admit informing of recourses
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
38. According to defendants instructions, plaintiff sought
payment through the processes of the courts.
C - without knowledge, therefore denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
39. In seeking payment, plaintiff was blamed for problems
associated with the material being wet, not dryable.
C - without knowledge, therefore denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
40. The dryabality problems were not known by plaintiff, but
known by defendant, this but information was withheld by
plaintiff.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
41.
The owner failed to inform its contractor Argee Corp or its
engineer Peterson of owner's knowledge of the different
conditions.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
42. Plaintiff was held liable for the information had only by
the owner and withheld by the owner.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
43. Conditions that were encountered differed materially from
those indicated, which engineer relied upon to his detriment,
thus engineer Peterson is entitled to recover because the
contract documents misrepresented conditions that would be
encountered. Entitlement is based upon referenced law.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
44. The plaintiff was defamed in his industry and family, and
still not paid.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
45. The defendant owner is responsible to the plaintiff for his
costs, losses, and damages for their withholding of information.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
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46. If defendants claim this action by the plaintiff is not
timely, then defendants instruction to the plaintiff were
fraudulent.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
47. According to law, plaintiff has properly notified defendant
of his dilemma and losses giving "notice of claim."
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
48. The court in the "STATE OF UTAH OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICE"
is a "court having jurisdiction in the county in which the
contract was performed and executed" per 14-1-7 and 14-1-15.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
49. Plaintiff made a proper claim and action in a court having
jurisdiction in the county where plaintiff's labors (his
technologies) and his equipment was being used.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
50. Defendants are liable to plaintiff by default for their
failure to answer.
C - denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
51. The Peterson's family income had been only around $7,000 per
year because of their business being crippled from not being paid
for its work, thus they became vulnerable from outsiders.
C - without knowledge, therefore denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
52. Evidently with a call from an attorney John P. Sampson and
by his supposed letter, Sampson apparently persuaded State
attorney Peter Van Alstein to disallow or remove previous filings
of the board of directors of current record, which directors were
of record of the initial filing of Peterson's corporation.
C - without knowledge, therefore denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
53. The effect of Sampson's actions were to take control of
plaintiff's business and give control to Sampson's clients Robert
Mouritsen and John McSweeney who have repeatedly and fraudulently
filed as officers and directors over the filing of Peterson and
his lawfully initially registered directors to steal Peterson's
and His family's business and properties.
C - without knowledge, therefore denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
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54. Attorney John P. Sampson's in affidavit fraudulently claims
to be attorney and representative for Riverside Machine and
Fabrication (MAC Industries) back in June of 1986 and since.
C - without knowledge, therefore denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
55. In contradiction, in the court of Judge John Rokich in
affidavit attorney John P. Sampson states that he has never been
attorney for Peterson or any of his businesses.
C - without knowledge, therefore denied
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied
56. Attorney Van Alstein for the State of Utah told Peterson
that anyone at anytime can come to his division and file
themselves as officers and directors of any corporation on file
in the state of Utah.
C - to be answered by Van Alstyne, wrongdoing denied
H - denies the allegations
57. State Attorney Van Alstein has no basis for removing filed
documents.
C - to be answered by Van Alstyne, wrongdoing denied
H - denies the allegations
58. The defendant's operation of his Corporations and Commercial
Code Division allowed the invasion of others into and over
plaintiff's business.
C - to be answered by Van Alstyne, wrongdoing denied
H - denies the allegations
59. The defendant's attorney Peter Van Alstein intervened and
canceled plaintiff's proper and lawful filings of his business
posturing his company for a fraudulent takeover allowable and
possible because of unlawful actions and bad operation code of
the defendant's (The State of Utah).
C - to be answered by Van Alstyne, wrongdoing denied
H - denies the allegations
60. The defendant is thus liable to the plaintiff for his
overturned taking of his business and properties, property he was
deprived of, without due process of law guaranteed to him by
ARTICLE V of the Constitution and taken without the right of
trial jury preserved to him by ARTICLE VII of the Constitution.
C - to be answered by Van Alstyne, wrongdoing denied
H - denies the allegations
61. Attorney Van Alstein further stated that he would welcome a
law suite in this matter to obtain decisions of how to deal with
this perpetual problem relating to paper thievery of Utah
8
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Corporations.
C - to be answered by Van Alstyne, wrongdoing denied
H - denies the allegations
ENTITLEMENT
62. Peterson has lost 1/4 million dollars in direct costs not
paid for in providing equipment and technology to move the Vitro
tailings and additional costs of six million dollars for losses
to his businesses and additional costs of ten million dollars for
damages to his children and marriage.
C - denied
H - denies the allegations
III
Wherefore, plaintiff prays as follows:
63. A temporary restraining order issued restraining defendant,
his servants, and employees, form selling plaintiff's equipment.
64. A preliminary injunction issue enjoining defendant, his
servants, and employees, from using plaintiff's designs and
equipment without paying plaintiff for his cost of providing said
designs and equipment.
65. That the court enforce a default judgment for defendant's
failure to answer plaintiff's claims of January 6th of 1989.
66. That the court finds defendants in default for not providing
a timely good and sufficient payment bond as required by law.
67. On a final hearing, defendant, his agents, servants, and
employees be permanently enjoined from ever using plaintiff's
designs and equipment without paying plaintiff for his cost of
providing said designs and equipment.
68. That plaintiff receive costs and expenses incurred in this
action.
67. That the plaintiff receive entitlement for damages for
defendant's withholding of information detriment to plaintiff.
That the plaintiff receive entitlement for the* fraudulent
representations of conditions and bonding of the defendant.
70. That Plaintiff receive such other additional relief as the
court deems proper.
Certified in affidavit as true and thus dated this
th day

o£ May 1 9 9
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (#3312)
Attorney General
Melissa Hubbell (#5090)
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Division
130 Utah State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1019

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

THE STATE OF UTAH
Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson
Kenneth L. Alkema
Peter Van Alstyne

i
i
i
i

ANSWER of Division of
Corporations and Commercial
Code, Department of Commerce
Peter Van Alstyne

i
i
]

Civil No. 900-90053
Honorable Leonard H. Russon

Defendants.

Defendant, Peter Alstyne in his capacity as Director of
the Department of Commerce, Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code, ("Department of Commerce"), by and through
counsel, Melissa M. Hubbell, Assistant Attorney General, answers
Plaintiff's Complaint as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
Division responds to the specific allegations of
Plaintiff's complaint as follows.
1.

Defendant is without sufficient knowledge and

information to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the
Plaintiff's complaint and therefore denies the same. Furthermore,
these particular allegations relate specifically to allegations
against defendants Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson and Kenneth L. Alkema
and the same will be answered by them in a separate response.
2.

Defendant admits to the allegations contained in

paragraph 5.
6.

Defendant denies the allegations contained in

paragraphs 28 and 29 of the plaintiff's complaint.

Furthermore,

these particular allegations have no relation to the complaint
against Peter Van Alstyne who is being sued on behalf of the
Division.
7.

Defendant is without sufficient knowledge and

information to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations
contained in paragraphs 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, and
55 of the Plaintiff's complaint and therefore denies the same.

- 2 -

Furthermore, these particular allegations relate specifically to
allegations against defendants Mark S, Day, Fred Nelson and
Kenneth L. Alkema and the same will be answered by them in a
separate response.
8.

Defendant denies the allegations contained in

paragraphs 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61 and 62 of the plaintiff's
complaint.
GENERAL DENIAL
Defendants, and each of them, deny each and every
allegation of plaintiff's complaint not expressly admitted in
this answer.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
SECOND DEFENSE
This court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the plaintiff's claims against the defendants.
THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Governmental
Notice of Claim provisions, which is a condition precedent to
filing this action.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Defendant, the State of Utah, has not waived its
sovereign immunity and, accordingly, plaintiff's claims for
relief are barred.
- 3 -

SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's alleged causes of action, and each of them,
are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff, as a party to previously settled lawsuits
involving the same issues that are alleged in this action, is
collaterally estopped from bringing the instant action.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's alleged causes of action are barred by the
equitable doctrines of estoppel, waiver, and/or laches.
NINTH DEFENSE
Any contractual claims against any or all defendants
asserted by the plaintiff, which claims defendants specifically
deny, are barred because there is no privity of contract between
the plaintiff and the defendants.
TENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to a default
judgment for claims he made against the defendants in an
administrative action before the State Office of Rescovery
Services (see paras. 48-50 of the plaintiff's complaint).
Plaintiff has previously alleged these same claims in other
pleadings and has been informed by various judges that the Office
of Recovery Services conducts administrative hearings and has no
jurisdiction to entertain the claims alleged by the plaintiff.
In addition, plaintiff also alleges claims of fraud and
defamation against the defendants.
- 4 -

These claims are without

merit and have not been brought or asserted in good faith and, as
a result, the defendants are entitled to award of attorneys' fees
for defending such claims pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-56. (1953, as amended).
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Complaint, the
defendants requests that said claims be dismissed and the relief
prayed for by the plaintiff be denied, and that the defendants be
awarded their costs, attorneys fees and such other relief as the
court may deem appropriate.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on this^

day of June, 1990.

MeljLissa M r HubbeTl
^
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this U

day of June, 1990, I

caused to be mailed via United States Postal Service, first
class, postage prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
ANSWER, first class, postage prepaid, to:
William D. Peterson
c/o Paul E. Peterson
1444 Murphy's Lane
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone (801)775 -1483, 485-9011
Plaintiffs
M&niss^M. Hubbell
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div.

- 6 -

R. PAUL VAN DAM, USB #3312
Attorney General
DENISE CHANCELLOR, USB #5452
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1017
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. PETERSON,
:
Plaintiff,

ANSWER OF STATE OF UTAH,
MARK S. DAY, FRED NELSON
AND KENNETH L. ALKEMA

:

v.

Civil No. 900900523

THE STATE OF UTAH, MARK S. DAY,
FRED NELSON, KENNETH L. ALKEMA
PETER VAN ALSTYNE,

:

Defendants.

:

:

Judge L. H. RUSSON

Comes now defendants, the State of Utah; Mark S. Day in
his capacity as Project Manager, UMTRA Projects, Bureau of
Radiation Control, Utah Department of Health; Fred Nelson, in his
capacity as Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah; and
Kenneth L. Alkema, in his capacity as Director of Environmental
Health, Utah Department of Health and answers Plaintiff's
Complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Defendants answer, admit and deny the specific
averments of plaintiff's complaint as follows:
1.

Paragraph 1 is admitted

2.

Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to

form a belief as to the truth of the matter alleged in paragraphs
2 and 3 and the same are therefore denied.
3.

Paragraph 4 is denied.

4.

Paragraph 5 is admitted.

5.

Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to

form a belief as to the truth of the matter alleged in paragraph
6 and the same are therefore denied.
6.

Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to

form a belief as to the truth of the matter alleged in paragraphs
7 through 9 and the same are therefore denied.
7.

Paragraphs 10 through 12 are denied.

8.

The project documents for the Vitro Tailings

Project speaks for themselves and to the extent that paragraph 13
is inconsistent with those documents, the same is denied.
9.

Utah Code Annotated S 63-56-38 (1953, as amended)

speaks for itself and to the extent that paragraph 14 is
inconsistent with the statute, the same is denied.
10.

Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to

form a belief as to the truth of the matter alleged in paragraph
15 and the same is therefore denied.
11.

Paragraph 16 is denied.

12.

Defendants deny the allegation in paragraph 17

that they did not have a good and sufficient payment bond but
admit that plaintiff complained to the State.
13.

Paragraphs 18 through 20 are denied.

14.

Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to

form a belief as to the truth of the matters alleged in
paragraphs 21 and 22 and the same are therefore denied.
15.

Paragraphs 23 through 26 are denied.

16.

The performance bond for the Vitro Tailings

Project speaks for itself and to the extent that the plaintiff's
characterizations in paragraph 27 are inconsistent with the
language of the performance bond, the same are denied.
17.

Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953

speaks for itself and, accordingly, defendants deny plaintiff's
characterizations in paragraph 28.
18.

Paragraphs 29 through 35 are denied.

19.

The Project Manual for the Vitro Tailings Project

speaks for itself and any characterizations made by the plaintiff
in paragraph 36 are denied.
20.

Paragraph 37 is denied but defendants admit that

they informed plaintiff that his recourse was against the
contractor, Argee Corporation, and the bonding companies.
21.

Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to

form a belief as to the truth of the matters alleged in
paragraphs 38 and 39 and the same are therefore denied.
22.

Paragraph 40 through 50 are denied.

23.

Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to

form a belief as to the truth of the matter alleged in paragraphs
51 through 55 and the same are therefore denied.

- ^ -

24.

Paragraphs 56 through 61 relate specifically to

allegations against defendant Peter Van Alstyne and the same will
be answered by Mr. Van Alstyne under a separate response and to
the extent that the allegations in paragraphs 56 through 61
charge the defendants answering herein with wrongdoing or
liability the same are denied.
25.

Paragraph 62 is denied.
GENERAL DENIAL

Defendants, and each of them, deny each and every
allegation of plaintiff's complaint not expressly admitted in
this Answer.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
SECOND DEFENSE
The court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of
plaintiff's claims against the defendants.
THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff fails to state claim upon which relief may be
granted.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to comply with the governmental
Notice of Claim provisions, which is a condition precedent to
filing this action.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Defendant, the State of Utah, has not waived its
sovereign immunity and, accordingly, plaintiff's claims for
relief are barred.

SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's alleged causes of action, and each of them,
are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff, as a party to previously settled lawsuits
involving the same issues that are alleged in this action, is
collaterally estopped from bringing the instant action,
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's alleged causes of action are barred by the
equitable doctrines of estoppel, waiver, and/or laches.
NINTH DEFENSE
Any contractual claims against any or all defendants
asserted by the plaintiff, which claims defendants specifically
deny, are barred because there is no privity of contract between
plaintiff and the defendants.
TENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to a default
judgment for claims he made against the defendants in an
administrative action before the State of Utah Office of Recovery
Service (see paras. 48-50 of plaintiff's complaint).

Plaintiff

has previously alleged these same claims in other pleadings and
has been informed by various judges that the Office of Recovery
Services conducts administrative hearings and has no jurisdiction
to entertain the claims alleged by the plaintiff.

In addition,

plaintiff also alleges claims of fraud and defamation against the
defendants.

These claims are without merit and have not been
- R -

brought or asserted in good faith and, as a result, defendants
are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees for defending such
claims pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. (1953, as
amended) § 78-27-56.
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Complaint, the
defendants request that said claims be dismissed and the relief
prayed for be denied, and that the defendants be awarded their
costs, attorneys fees and such other relief as the court may deem
^

appropriate.
DATED this

ty^

day of June, 1990.
R. PAUL. VAN DAM
Utah/Attorney G

Denise Ch
Assistant Attorney General

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
Answer of the State of Utah, Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson and Kenneth
L. Alkema was mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to William D.
Peterson, c/o Paul E. Peterson, 1444 Murphy's Lane, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84106.
DATED this A ^

day of June, 1990.

Denise Chajrcellor
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July 9, 1990
William D. Peterson
c/o Paul E. Peterson
1444 Murphy's Lane
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone (801)485-9011, 278-3435
file: \legal\state\Int-reql
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
William D. Peterson
Plaintiff,

Plaintiff's First Request
for
Written Interrogatories

-vsThe State of Utah
Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson
Kenneth L. Alkema
Peter Van Alstein
Defendants

Civil No. 900900523
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Plaintiff
Procedure,

pursuant to

hereby

answered by

submits

defendants, and

Rule 33
the

of

the Utah

following

each of them,

Rules of

Civil

Interrogatories to
under oath,

be

within 20

days of the receipt of the same.
APPENDIX "A"
A.

"Identify" all sources of your answers.

B.

As

used in these Interrogatories, the term "identify" as

applied to a person (as defined) means
and

residence

address,

individual, the

type of

occupation,

to state his name, business
job

entity and the

title,
address of

and

if

not an

its principal

place of business, or government.
C.

As

used in these Interrogatories, the term "identify" as

applied to a document means to

state the type of document (letter,
1
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memorandum,

etc.), the identity

date authored

or originated, the

the original or a copy was
such person

of the author

known or

or originator, the

identify of each person

to whom

addressed or delivered, the identity of

reasonably believed by

you to

have present

possession, custody, or control thereof, and a brief description of
the subject matter thereof.
D.

As

applied

to

used in these Interrogatories, the term "identify" as
a

communication

communication, the type
meeting, etc.), the

to

state

the

date

of communication (telephone

who received

of

the

conversation,

place where the communication took

identity of the person who
each person

means

place, the

made the communication, the identity of
the

communication, and

of each

person

present when it was made, and the subject matter discussed.
E.

As

applied to a
place of

used in these Interrogatories, the term "identify" as
meeting means to state

the meeting, each

the date of the

person invited to attend,

meeting, the
each person

who attended, ad the subject matter discussed.
F.

Omissions.

any fact, person,
any of

The failure to state, identify or describe

document or other item of

these interrogatories

deemed a

in your

information called by

responses thereto

representation that such fact, person,

shall be

document or other

item of information as not known to you.
G.

Witnesses and

each interrogatory

Relevant documents.

(1) identify each

For

each answer

person known to you

to

who has

knowledge of the facts supporting your answer and (2) identify each
2
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document containing information

in support of your answer

to each

interrogatory.
H.

Failure to make or cooperate in discovery*

In

answering

to the plaintiff's complaints, the defendant repeatedly stated that
he

was without

knowledge•

instances where the
record keeper of
providing

This answer

given even

in many

defendant is the legal receiver, approver, and

said documents.

answers,

was

even

Further failure

in this

and

future

to cooperate in

discovery

will be

considered a failure to answer per Rule 37 (a) (3).
INTERROGATORIES
Answer, identify, and explain your answer to the following:
Records of the
Argee Admitted,

court of Judge Bruce Jenkins

even counterclaimed the

clearly show and

problems for the

way the

equipment operated with the overly wet tailings material, the state
of Utah also charged Peterson
yet in answer

for not removing his equipment used,

to complaint 2. the defendant

Peterson furnished

said equipment.

denied knowledge that

Attorney John P.

Sampson has

been a long time friend and attorney for Robert Mouritsen
McSweeney who are thieves of properties from Peterson.
of interest, Mouritsen and McSweeney

Sampson exerted duress and

to

unlawfully

Jenkins for payment

settle the

In conflict

caused Sampson to be attorney

for Peterson.
supposedly

and John

fraud coercing Peterson

Argee

matter

for Peterson's RR car dumper.

befor.e Judge
Settlement was

illegal and payment to him for his work has never been made.
1.

Why does not

Peterson still retain legal ownership
3
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car

dumper at Clive

in view

of his

work provided,

and supposed

settlement to him for his work?
2.

How did the

state of Utah get their claimed

ownership of the

RR-car dumper at Clive?
3.

How long was Peterson's rail

car dumper system used in moving

the Vitro tailings?
4.

When the

paid for his

plaintiff was not

paid, he complained of

not being

work to the state's attorney Fred Nelson, the state's

engineer Mark Day, and even directly to governor Norm Bangerter, by
a letter,

which prompted

three have of the

a reply.

What knowledge

do the

above

plaintiff's then complaints and what did they do

and what did they inform the plaintiff were his recourses?
5.

Part

that his

of plaintiff complaint above was informing the defendant
bond was

faulty.

What changes

were made

in the

bond

documents after the plaintiff's complaint in July of 1985?
6.

The payment

per (Title

bond document of

14, Chapter 1, Sec.

4th of Jan 1985

5, U.C.A. 1953 as

was referenced
Amended) having

paragraphs stating the following:
NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such that
if the said Principal shall faithfully perform the contract in
accordance with the plans, specifications, and conditions
thereof, then this obligation shall be void; otherwise to
remain in full force and effect.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that this bond is executed pursuant to the
provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended, and all liabilities on this bond to all such
claimants shall be
determined in accordance with
said
provisions to the same extent as if it were copied at length
herein.

4
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a)

Bond documents dated 15th of August 1985 were added to the
project manual nearly eight months after start of the contract
referencing (Title 63, Chapter 56 U.C.A,m 1953 as Amended)
instead of Title 14, Chapter 1 above.

b)

In the payment bond document of 15th of August 1985 the
following was replaced: if the said Principal shall faithfully
perform
the contract
in
accordance with
the
plans,
specifications, and conditions thereof
the above was replaced with:
Principal shall pay all claimants supplying labor or materials
to him or his subcontractors.

Is it true that the above changes were made?
7.

What knowledge does

bond documents

the defendant have of

after initial contracting

changes to payment

in January of

1985, and

why were the changes made?
8.

Does the plaintiff have entitlement

Utah Code

Annotated 1953

per Title 14, Chapter

as stated in

the payment

1,

bond document

dated the 4th of January 1985?
9.

What entitlement to

payment do the defendants

bond documents

indicate that the plaintiff have coming if he provided RR car

dump

equipment but was not paid as he claims.
10.
their

What was

the good and

sufficient payment bond

project which the defendant had

applicable to

when they initially started

contracted as they were required to have by law.
11.

Why did

not the disclaimer

as indicated in 6

above make the

payment obligations void as the paragraph states.
12.

Why is the defendant not required to pay plaintiff's costs per

Title 14, chapter 1, Sec. 7 or otherwise?
13.

Why were the payment bond changes of August 15th 1985 made?
5
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14.

If

Argee did

accordance

indeed

"faithfully

perform

the

contract

in

with the plans, specifications, and conditions thereof,

then was their

payment bond requirement indeed void

as the signed

agreement stated.
15.

The

Argee Corporation

from the State

received around

five million

for increased costs in view that

dollars

the tailings were

not dryable as the basic

contract indicated.

had by the State of Utah

relative to the wetness or dryability

the

tailings and

which information

What information was

was not

given to

of

Argee upon

their initially obtaining the contract in January of 1985.
16.

Was it

true that the

did have wetness
the

State

Argee Corporation found that

or dryability of

failed to

provide

to

the State

the tailings information
Argee upon

their

which

contracting?

Explain the basis for Argee being paid for additional costs to ship
the material wetter that anticipated.
17.

What knowledge does the defendant have that the plaintiff, the

provider

of equipment

to move

the tailings

was informed

of the

additional requirement due to the additional wetness?
18.

According

to the same

not the plaintiff be also

entitlement of Argee

Corp, why should

entitled to his additional cost incurred

due to information being withheld

from him, which also incurred to

him additional costs for which he was not paid?
19.

Argee referenced laws

and the plaintiff also

referenced laws

which give entitlement to him for the defendants failure to provide
information

which it

had but

withheld
6

to the

detriment of

its
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subcontractors•

As

Argee had entitlement per the

referenced law,

why does not the plaintiff also have entitlement per the referenced
law?
20.

The plaintiff

Utah.
proper
basis

claim in lawful

The defendant has made claim
court of
of

jurisdiction.

this

contract laws
having

has made

claim,
Title 14

jurisdiction

in

defendant

contention

and Title
the

the State

that this action is not in the

Would the

even its

courts of

63 in

county

with

which

in which

explain its

its referenced

is quoted
the

"court

contract

was

performed and executed per 14-1-7 and 14-1-15?
21.

Title 14

and Title

63 law

specifically express

plaintiff's

right for payment in the event he is not paid and in the event
payment

bond is

not

sovereign immunity

proper.

Why

or any barring

does the
of this

defendant

the

have any

action in view

of its

usage of laws referenced which specifically give entitlement to the
plaintiff?
22.

Explain any basis it has for immunity.

Explain

all

basis

according to defendant's

the plaintiff

could

be

requirements to insure

including defendant's payment

paid

his costs

that he is

bond commitments as required

paid,
by law

or any other basis, as for any provider of work who is not paid.
23.

Why should not the

plaintiff be paid in view of

ARTICLE V of

the Constitution of the United States?
24.

Give

any

reasons

according ARTICLE

why

V of the

the

plaintiff

above and explain

being paid are not un-constitutional?
7

should

be

not

why reasons of

paid
not
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23.

Is the courts of the

Office of Recovery Services a legitimate

organization and have jurisdiction in the State of Utah?
24.

Can

the

judges

of

the

Office

of

Recovery

Services hold

hearings of complaint?
25.

Can those called into attending hearings of complaints

courts of
and

the Office of Recovery

in

defending,

can

make claims, or have

defendants

make

at the

a defense,

statements,

claims,

counterclaims etc?
24.

Wm

Peterson founded

and filed its articles
its

owner.

By

Fabrication

was

Manufacturing

of incorporation.

its

board of

merged

Company.

Divisions of Corporations.
are display

Riverside Machine and

Peterson

These

papers

Riverside Machine

Product
are

Approvals of the

director Peter Van

defendant's filings show?

Wm Peterson was and

directors,

into

Fabrication wrote

on

at

&

Utah's

corporations filings

Alstein's signature.

If there are any

and

Engineering
file

is

What

do the

differences, what are

they?
25.

According

McSweeney,
Board

to

John P.

of Directors

John

P. Sampson,

Sampson was

Robert

this

of Riverside

Mouritsen,

and John

plaintiff's attorney.

Machine

and Fabrications

The
filed

affidavits declaring conflictive interest of attorney Sampson where
he has

been representing both

resigned from
court of

Attorney Satmpson

representing Peterson and

Judge John

explain his

sides.

Rokich, Peterson

activities and positions
8

ha.s never

his company where
has requested that

and that he resign

in the
Sampson
from his
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representation of

Peterson and

his company.

Sampson has

stated

that he no longer represents Peterson but he has not explained when
this representation discontinued.

In the

Van Alstein who

has rights to determine for

Fabrication, Wm

Peterson who its

view of director

Peter

Riverside Machine and

owner and his founding

board of

directors, or interfering attorney John P. Sampson and his thieving
colleagues Robert Mouritsen and John McSweeney?
26.

By what basis

Alstein able to

of rules or law is defendant director Peter Van

remove lawfully

and properly

filed documents

of

record which determine ownership and control of the business?
27.

By what basis of

rules or law is defendant director Peter Van

Alstein able to remove the

lawfully and properly filed document of

merger of Peterson's business Riverside Machine and Fabrication?
28.

Of a business owner, or his conflictive and thieving attorney,

which, the owner or his counsel, have last rights

in directing the

matters of the owners business?
29.
the

In the control of a
existing

board

of

themselves as the board of

business, without consent or knowledge of
directors,

can

outside

parties

elect

directors, make and issue company stock

to themselves, then record themselves

as being the lawful board of

directors and owners of the business?
30.

Is the policy of defendant director Peter Van Alstein to allow

fraudulent

thieving business takeovers by the

the means the

method above and by

defendant director Van Alstein has

Mouritsen, McSweeney, and Sampson?
9
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31.

Instead

of aiding

one side

or

interfering with

the other,

would it not be better, even more legal, for the defendant's office
of corporations

to not take

sides, not change filings,

and allow

conflicting parties to settle their differences in a court of law?
32.

In the immediate matter, has not the defendant

Alstein taken sides

with plaintiff's

director Van

conflictive attorney

defendant additionally liable for plaintiff's losses?

making

Defendant's

position needs to be declared and justified by its law.
33.
of

Copies

of plaintiff's filings bearing the approving signature

their filings are included.

Defendant

Van Alstein's position

needs to be declared and justified by its law as to

plaintiff's

rights and the current status of his filings.
Dated this S th day of July 1990.
William D. Peterson
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing
Plaintiff's First Request for Written Interrogatories
was served,
to:
The State of Utah
.*
A
Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson y~40~&7
h\tyXH~
Kenneth L. Alkema,
. •> ^ ^ 4 "u,
yPeter Van Alstein
/< / / " o<> / > f v / c / ^

^ 7-2- 96 fop*^

this y
day of July, 1990, by delivery to their attorney:
the
office of Utah Attorney General, Paul VanDam, State Capital
Building, County of Salt Lake.
William D. Peterson
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R. PAUL VAN DAM, USB #3312
Attorney General
DENISE CHANCELLOR, USB #5452
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1017
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
•

WILLIAM D. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
:
:

v.

DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET
OF INTERROGATORIES
Civil No, 900900523

THE STATE OF UTAH, MARK S. DAY,
FRED NELSON, KENNETH L. ALKEMA
PETER VAN ALSTYNE,
Defendants.

:
:
*

Judge L. H. RUSSON

Defendants, the State of Utah, Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson
and Kenneth L. Alkema hereby submits the following Responses and
Objections to Plaintiff William D. Peterson's First Set of
Interrogatories•

GENERAL OBJECTIONS
1.

Defendants object to the instructions contained in

Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories on the grounds and to
the extent that they request or purport to impose upon the
defendants any obligation to respond in a manner or scope beyond
the requirements set forth in Rules 26-37 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff's instructions are vague, overbroad,

unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.

2.

Defendants object to Instruction B to the extent

it requires disclosure of the home address of employees or former
employees of the State.
3.

Defendants object to plaintiff's inflammatory

introductory statement setting forth purported facts, for the
most part unrelated to the defendants.

The defendants have no

information or belief as to the truth of the matters asserted and
to the extent that an admission is requested, the same is denied.
This introductory language is argumentative, not in accord with
discovery rules or practice and is an abuse of the discovery
process.
4.

Defendants object that plaintiff has failed to

sequentially number his interrogatories,

where there are

duplicate-numbered interrogatories, defendants will refer to the
interrogatory by number as well as the page number where the
interrogatory appears in plaintiff's document.

INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatory No. 1: why does not Peterson still
retain legal ownership of the RR car dumper at Clive in view of
his work provided, and supposed settlement to him for his work?
Response to InterroQatory »n. i.

Defendants object to

this interrogatory on the grounds that it is not within the scope
of discovery under Rule 26 Utah R. Civ. P.,

is

not reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and,
furthermore, calls for a conclusion of law.

Interrogatory No, 2: How did the state of Utah get
their claimed ownership of the RR-car dumper at Clive?
Response to Interrogatory No. 2;

The State of Utah

responds that it acquired the railroad car dumper under a
settlement agreement with Argee Corporation.
Interrogatory No. 3:

How long was Peterson's rail car

dumper system used in moving the Vitro tailings?
Response to Interrogatory No. 3:

Defendants have no

information or belief that the railroad dumper system was owned
by Mr. Peterson.

With the foregoing limitation, defendants

respond that the railroad dumper system that the State contracted
with Argee Corporation to operate was in place at Clive from
approximately June 1985 until March 1987.
Interrogatory No. 4: When the plaintiff was not paid,
he complained of not being paid for his work to the state's
attorney Fred Nelson, the state's engineer Mark Day, and even
directly to governor Norm Bangerter, by a letter, which prompted
a reply.

What knowledge do the above three have of the

plaintiff's then complaints and what did they do and what did
they inform the plaintiff were his recourses?
Response to Interrogatory No. 4:

Defendants object to

this interrogatory on the grounds that it is vague and overbroad.
Defendants also object to the phrase "[w]hen the plaintiff was
not paid" on the grounds that plaintiff fails to state with
particularity who had purportedly failed to pay him.

Without

waiving these objections, defendants respond as follows:

(a)

Fred Nelson recalls a conversation with Mr.

Peterson whereby Mr. Nelson told Mr. Peterson that he did not
have a contractual relationship with the State and that his
recourse was against the contractor, Argee Corporation.
(b) Mark Day responds that he told Mr. Peterson that
the State had a valid payment bond and that his business was not
with the State but with the contractor, Argee, and/or the bonding
company.
(c) The Governor's Office has a letter on file from
Mr. Peterson dated December 29, 1987 and a response thereto dated
January 19, 1988.

If there has been any correspondence earlier

than the foregoing date it has been archived and access thereto
would be unreasonably burdensome.

If Mr. Peterson has

corresponded with or had correspondence from the Governor's
Office prior to December 1987, he may more easily obtain copies
of this correspondence from his files.
Interrogatory No. 5t

Part of plaintiff(sic) complaint

above was informing the defendant that his bond was faulty.

What

changes were made in the bond documents after the plaintiff's
complaint in July of 1985?
Response to Interrogatory No. 5:

Defendants object to

the assertion in plaintiff's interrogatory that the State changed
its bond documents as a result of plaintiff's purported July 1985
complaint.

The State responds that any changes to the bond

documents are reflected in the documents on file with the Utah
Department of Health, where they are available for inspection and
copying.

Interrogatory No* 6:

The payment bond document of 4th

of Jan 1985 was referenced per (Title 14, Chapter 1, Sec. 5,
U.C.A. 1953 as Amended) having paragraphs stating the following:
NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is
such that if the said Principal shall faithfully
perform the contract in accordance with the plans,
specifications, and conditions thereof, then this
obligation shall be void; otherwise to remain in full
force and effect.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that this bond is executed pursuant
to the provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, and all liabilities on this
bond to all such claimants shall be determined in
accordance with said provisions to the same extent as
if it were copied at length herein.
(a) Bond documents dated 15th of August 1985 were added to
the project manual nearly eight months after start of
the contract referencing (Title 63, Chapter 56 U.C.A.
1953 as amended) instead of Title 14, Chapter 1 above.
(b)

In payment bond document of 15th of August 1985 the
following was replaced: if the said Principal shall
faithfully perform the contract in accordance with the
plans, specifications, and conditions thereof
the above was replaced with:
Principal shall pay all claimants supplying labor or
materials to him of his subcontractors.

Is it true that the above changes were made?
Response to Interrogatory No. 6.

Plaintiff is referred

to the bond documents on file with the Utah Department of Health
where they are available for inspection and copying .
Interrogatory No. 7: What knowledge does the defendant
have of changes to payment bond documents after initial
contracting in January of 1985, and why were the changes made?
Response to Interrogatory No. 7:

Defendants refer the

plaintiff to defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 5.
addition, the State responds that some changes to the bond
documents were made to correct clerical errors.

In

Interrogatory No. 8;

Does the plaintiff have

entitlement per Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as
stated in the payment bond document dated the 4th of January
1985?
Response to Interrogatory •». p. Defendants object to
this interrogatory on the grounds that it is not within the scope
of the rules of discovery and, furthermore, calls for a legal
conclusion.
Interrogatory No. 9:

What entitlement to payment does

the defendants(sic) bond documents indicate that the plaintiff
have coming if he provided RR car dump equipment but was not paid
as he claims.
Response to Interrogatory nn. q.

Defendants object to

Interrogatory No. 9 on the grounds that the question is
speculative, calls for a hypothetical response, and is not within
the scope of the rules of discovery.

Defendants refer plaintiff

to their objection in response to Interrogatory No. 3.
Interrogatory No. 10: what was the good and sufficient
payment bond applicable to their project which the defendant had
when they initially started contracted(sic) as they were required
to have by law.
Response to Interrogatory No. 10; Plaintiff is
referred to the documents on file with the Utah Department of
Health, which are available for inspection and copying.
Interrogatory No. 11; why did not the disclaimer as
indicated in 6 above make the payment obligations void as the
paragraph states.

Response to Interrogatory No, 11:

Defendants object to

this interrogatory on the grounds that it is not within the scope
of the rules of discovery and, furthermore, asks defendants to
render a legal opinion to the plaintiff.
Interrogatory No, 12: Why is the defendant not
required to pay plaintiff's costs per Title 14, chapter 1, Sec. 7
or otherwise?
Response to Interrogatory No. 12: Defendants object to
this interrogatory on the grounds that it is duplicative, is not
within the scope of discovery and, furthermore, calls for a legal
conclusion.
Interrogatory No. 13: Why were the payment bond
changes of August 15th 1985 made?
Response to Interrogatory No. 13:

This interrogatory

is duplicative of Interrogatory No. 7. Accordingly, defendants
refer plaintiff to their response to Interrogatory No. 7.
Interrogatory No. 14:

If Argee did indeed "faithfully

perform the contract in accordance with the plans,
specifications, and conditions thereof, then was their payment
bond requirement indeed void as the signed agreement stated.
Response to Interrogatory No. 14: Defendants object to
this interrogatory on the grounds that it is not within the scope
of discovery, is vague, overbroad, speculative and calls for a
hypothetical response.

In addition, plaintiff requests

defendants to render a legal opinion.
Interrogatory No. 15: The Argee Corporation received
around five million dollars from the State for increased costs in

view that the tailings were not dryable as the basic contract
indicated.

What information was had by the State of Utah

relative to the wetness or dryability of the tailings and which
information was not given to Argee upon their initially obtaining
the contract in January 1985.
Response to Interrogatory No. 15;

Defendants object to

plaintiff's premise, contained in the first sentence of this
interrogatory, that Argee Corporation was paid moneys, in
addition to the contract price, because of the moisture content
of the tailings.

Defendants also object to plaintiff's assertion

that Argee was not given information as to the moisture content
of the tailings when it obtained the contract.

Without waiving

the foregoing objections, defendants respond that any information
that the defendants had with respect to the moisture content of
the tailings was contained in the bid documents and in the files
at the Health Department, which are available for inspection.
Interrogatory No. 16: Was it true that the Argee
Corporation found that the State did have wetness or dryability
of tailings information which the State failed to provide to
Argee upon their contracting?

Explain the basis for Argee being

paid for additional costs to ship the material wetter than
anticipated.
Response to Interrogatory No. 16: Defendants repeat
their response to Interrogatory No. 15 and objections contained
therein.

In addition, defendants respond that one of the

conditions of the bid for the Vitro project was that each bidder
was required to make an independent verification of site

conditions and that bid information distributed by the Health
Department was no substitute for such independent verification.
Defendants respond to the last sentence of plaintiff's
interrogatory that Argee Corporation was paid funds in addition
to the contract price to settle an arbitration dispute.
Interrogatory No. 17: What knowledge does the
defendant have that the plaintiff, the provider of equipment to
move the tailings[,] was informed of the additional requirement
due to the additional wetness?
Response to Interrogatory No. 17;

Defendants object to

Interrogatory No. 17 on the following grounds:
(a) The defendants object to the statement "the
plaintiff [was] the provider of equipment to move the tailings"
in Interrogatory No. 17 as overbroad and ambiguous.

Defendants

reiterate their objection contained in response to Interrogatory
No. 3.
(b) Defendants also object to the statement "was
informed of the additional requirement due to the additional
wetness" as vague and overbroad and does not state with
reasonable particularity a question which defendants can
reasonably answer.
Without having waived the above objections, defendants,
to the best of their information and belief, do not know what
plaintiff was informed of as to the moisture content of the
tailings.
Interrogatory No. 18: According to the same
entitlement of Argee Corp, why should not the plaintiff be also

entitled to his additional cost incurred due to information being
withheld from him, which also incurred to him additional costs
for which he was not paid?
Response to Interrogatory wn. ia.

Defendants object to

this interrogatory on the grounds that it is not within the scope
of discovery under Rule 26 Utah R. Civ. P.,

is

not reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and,
furthermore, calls for a conclusion of law.
interrogatory No. 19: Argee referenced laws and the
plaintiff also referenced laws which give entitlement to him for
the defendants failure to provide information which had but
withheld to the detriment of its subcontractors.

As Argee had

entitlement per the referenced law, why does not plaintiff also
have entitlement per the referenced law?
Response to Interrogatory w». io.

Defendants object to

this interrogatory as duplicative, vague, ambiguous, not within
the scope of the rules of discovery and, furthermore, calls for a
legal conclusion.
Interrogatory No. 20: The plaintiff has made claim in
lawful courts of the State Utah.

The defendant has made claim

that this action is not in the proper court of jurisdiction.
Would the defendant explain its basis of this claim, even its
contention with its referenced contract laws Title 14 and Title
63 in which is quoted "court having jurisdiction in the county in
which the contract was performed and executed per 14-1-7 and 141-15?

Response to Interrogatory No* 20: Defendants object to
this interrogatory on the grounds that it vague and ambiguous/ is
not within the scope of the rules of discovery and, furthermore,
calls for the defendants to give legal advice to the plaintiff.
Interrogatory No. 21: Title 14 and Title 63 law
specifically express plaintiff's right for payment in the event
he is not paid and in the event the payment bond is not proper.
Why does the defendant have any sovereign immunity or any barring
of this action in view of its usage of laws referenced which
specifically give entitlement to this plaintiff?

Explain any

basis it has for immunity.
Response to Interrogatory No. 21: Defendants object to
this interrogatory on the grounds that it is ambiguous, vague,
overbroad, not within the scope of discovery, and, furthermore,
calls for a conclusion of law.
Interrogatory No. 22: Explain all basis the plaintiff
could be paid his costs according to defendant's requirements to
insure that he is paid, including defendant's payment bond
commitments as required by law or any other basis, as for any
provider of work who is not paid.
Response to Interrogatory No. 22: Defendants object to
this interrogatory as ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome, and not
within the scope of the rules of discovery.

Furthermore, this

interrogatory requests defendants to render legal advice to the
plaintiff.
Interrogatory No. 23 [p.7]:

Why should not the

plaintiff be paid in view of ARTICLE V of the Constitution
the United States?

of

Response to Interrogatory „n

„

[p.7].

Defendant8

object to this interrogatory as overbroad, not within the bounds
of discovery, and, furthermore, calls for a conclusion of law.
interrogatory No.

?4

[p

.7],

Give any reasons why the ^

plaintiff should be not paid according ARTICLE V of the above and
explain why reasons of not being paid are not unconstitutional?
Response to Interrogatory W .

OA

[p.7]s

Defe ndants

object to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is overbroad,
not within the scope of discovery, and, furthermore, calls for a
legal conclusion.
interrogatory No. 23 [p.8]:

is the courts(sic) of the

Office of Recovery Services a legitimate organization and have
jurisdiction in the State of Utah?
Response to Interrogatory MO „

[p.8].

Plaintiff

ig

referred to Utah Code Annotated Title 62A, Chapter 11, for the
statutory authority of the Office of Recovery Services.
Interrogatory No. ?4 [p.8]:

Can the judges of the

Office of Recovery Services hold hearings of complaint?
Response to Interrogatory » n

->A[ p . 8 ] :

Plaintiff

is

referred to defendants response to Interrogatory No. 23 [p.8].
interrogatory No. ?s [p.8]:

Can those called into

attending hearings of complaints at the court of the Office of
Recovery(sic) make claims, or have a defense, and in defending,
can defendants make statements, claims, counterclaims etc?
Response to Interrogatory M„

->K[ p # 8 ] |

Plalnti££

ig

referred to defendants response to Interrogatory No. 23 [p.8].

Interrogatories No* 24-33 rpp*8-101 and response
thereto;

These interrogatories are addressed to defendant Peter

VanAlstyne and will be answered under separate response by him.
The other defendants have no information or belief as to the
matters asserted in Interrogatories No. 24-33 [pp-8-10] and to
the extent that these interrogatories call for an admission the
same are denied.
DATED this 3o^

day of

Qt^M^

, 1990.

Respectfully submitted,
STATE OF UTAH

^imdAJmmM
Kenneth L. Alkema
Director
Division of Environmental Health
Utah Department of Health
288 No. 1460 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
(801) 538-6121

KENNETH L. ALKEMA

Director
Division of Environmental Health
Utah Department of Health
288 No. 1460 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
(801) 538-6121
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MARK S. DAY

'UMBTRA PrtfJ*
Bureau of Radiatiori^Control
Utah Department of Health
288 No. 1460 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
(801) 538-6734

FRED NELSON

^ssfistant Attorney General
Irice of the Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
(801) 538-1017
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

By__^ V ^ < ^ ^ ^
Den'iSe Chanodill
S t a t e of Utah
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
(801) 538-1017
Attorney for Defendants

_ 1

A

-

STATE OF UTAH
9*MAN

H. BANGEUTE*
GOvtRNO*

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
SALT LAKE CITY
64114

January 19, 1988

William D. Peterson
c/o Paul E. Peterson
2219 Panorama Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Dear Mr. Peterson:
My staff at the Utah Department of Health has been informed of the
concerns described in your letter of December 29, 1987. The health
department personnel indicateo to me that they have discussed this problem
numerous times with you and have exhausted all avenues of remedy as far as
any State obligation.
The Department of Health has cooperateo with you by supplying all
reouested documents for your review. If you would like further information
from the State's records, we will continue to offer the files for your
review. Please make an appointment with Mr. Mark S. Day at 538-6734.
Sincerely,

Norman H. bahgelter
Governor
NHB/MSD/bw

William D. Peterson
c/o Paul E. Peterson
2219 Panorama Way
Salt Late City, Utah 84117
December 29, 1987
Gov. Norman H Bangerter
State of Utah
Utah State Capitol
Salt Lat e City, Utah
Subject:
Re-f:

Vitro Tailing
Argee Doesn't Pay
Bond No. 944226, Seaboard No. 4035
Authority No. 752102

Dear Governor Bangerter:
I as an Engineer provided the technology -for dumping the RR
cars at Clive Ut. My company Pemco built and provided the dump
•facility which enabled the project to be -finishea a year early.
There was some $200,000 + owing to Pemco -for this wori . Pemco
has received nothing.
I have received nothing. As a result o-f
not being paid, I have lost all my business assets,
PEMCO "Froduct Engineering ? Manufacturing Co. waL>
a twelve year old business, employing up to 65
employees, doing worl- world wiat, so eci all zing in
material
hanaiing
systems,
local
projects
including the thirteen mile convenor to Antelooe
Island, and the Conveyors -for the Cnexron Snale
research

project.

Since Argee. for you, tool- and used my operating caoital, mybusiness has -failed to pro\ice -for me, my v\h-f E , c^c our si
children; thus, in addition to loosing mv business ($3, "^25, 0'JO) ,
I ha\e lost my Wi-fe, Si:; Children, and Home.
When I worked on the Vitro project, Utah had contracted with
Argee on the old bond law o-f (Title 14, Chapter 1, Sec. 4, UCfr
1953, as Amencea).
I understand that under the old lew I nc<\e
rights to reauest and be paid -for my costs o-f doing wor^ -for youi
benefit, the State o-f Utah.
I am hoping that I do have some
rights and I am thus making a request -for enumeration and am thus
soliciting -for your help.
Sincerely yours,
William D. Peterson, M.S., P.E.
also. President - Pemco

R. PAUL VAN DAM (#3312)
Attorney General
MELISSA M. HUBBELL (#5090)
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Division
Beneficial Life Tower, 11th Floor
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 533-3200

^X
#

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. PETERSON,

]| DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO
| PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET
]) OF INTERROGATORIES

Plaintiff,
vs.

]i Civil No 900900523

THE STATE OF UTAH , MARK S.
DAY, FRED NELSON, KENNETH L.
ALKEMA AND PETER VAN ALSTYNE,

]i Judge L. H. Russon
]
]

Defendants.

]

Defendant, the State of Utah, Department of Corporations,
Peter Van Alstynef by and through counsel, Assistant Attorney
General, Melissa M. Hubbell, hereby submits the following Answers
to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories.
GENERAL OBJECTIONS
1.

Defendant objects to the instructions contained in

Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories on the grounds and to the
extent that they request or purport to impose upon the defendants
1

any

obligation

to respond

in a manner or scope beyond

the

requirements set forth in Rules 26-37 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Plaintiff's instructions are vague, overbroad, unduly

burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
2.

Defendant objects to Instruction B to the extent it

requires disclosure of the home address of employees or former
employees of the State.
3.

Defendant

objects

to

plaintiff's

inflammatory

introductory statement setting forth purported facts, for the most
part unrelated to the defendants. The defendant has no information
or belief as to the truth of the matters asserted and to the extent
that

an

admission

introductory

is requested, the same is denied.

language

is

argumentative,

not

in

accord

This
with

discovery rules or practice and is an abuse of the discovery
process.
4.
sequentially

Defendant objects that plaintiff has failed to
number

his

interrogatories.

Where

there

are

duplicate-numbered interrogatories, defendants will refer to the
interrogatory by number as well as the page number where the
interrogatory appears in plaintiff's document.

2

INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatories Nos. 1-23 pages 3-7 and response thereto;
These interrogatories are addressed to Defendants Mark S. Day, Fred
Nelson, and Kenneth L. Alkema and will be answered under separate
response by them.

Peter Van Alstyne has no information or belief

as to the matters asserted in Interrogatories 1-23 pages 3-8 and to
the extent that these interrogatories call for an admission, the
same are denied.
Interrogatory No. 24:
Wm Peterson founded Riverside Machine and Fabrication
(sic) wrote and filed its article of incorporation.

Wm Peterson

was and is its owner. By its board of directors, Riverside Machine
and Fabrication was merged into Peterson Product Engineering &
Manufacturing Company. These papers are in file at Utah's Division
of Corporations. Approval of the corporations filings are display
(sic)

director Peter Van Alstyne's signature.

defendant's filings show?

What do the

If there are any differences, what are

they?
Answer;
Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the basis that
it is vague, overbroad and calls for a legal conclusimi. Without
waiving said objection, Defendant responds that these documents are

3

a

matter

of

public

record

and

available

to

the

Plaintiff.

Certified copies of these documents are attached.
Interrogatory No. 25:
According to John P. Sampson, Robert Mouritsen, and John
McSweeney, John P. Sampson was this plaintiff's attorney.

The

Board of Directors of Riverside Machine and Fabrications filed
affidavits declaring conf lictive interest of attorney Sampson where
he has been representing both sides.

Attorney Sampson has never

resigned from representing Peterson and his company where in the
court of Judge John Rokich, Peterson has requested that Sampson
explain his activities and positions and that he resign from his
representation of Peterson and his company.

Sampson has stated

that he no longer represents Peterson but he has not explained when
this representation discontinued.

In the view of director Peter

Van Alstyne who has rights to determine for Riverside Machine and
Fabrication, Wm Peterson who its owner (sic) and his founding board
of directors, or interfering attorney John P. Sampson and his
thieving colleagues Robert Mouritsen and John McSweeney?
Answer:
The Defendant objects to this interrogatory

on the

grounds that it is not within the scope of discovery under Rule 26,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is not reasonable calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence.
4

Furthermore, calls for

speculation on the part of the defendant.

In additionf the

question is vague, overbroad and calls for a hypothetical response.
Interrogatory No. 26;
By what basis of rules or law is defendant director Peter
Van Alstyne able to remove lawfully and properly filed documents of
record which determine ownership and control of the business?
Answer;
The Business Corporation Act, Utah Code Annotated Section
16-10-132 gives Peter Van Alstyne, as director of the Division of
Corporations, the power and authority reasonably necessary to
enable him to administer the Business Corporation Act sufficiently
and to perform the duties therein imposed upon him.
Interrogatory No. 27;
By what basis of rules or law is defendant director Peter
Van Alstyne able to remove the lawfully and properly filed document
of merger of Peterson's business Riverside Machine and Fabrication?
Answer;
See answer to Interrogatory Number 26.
Interrogatory No. 28;
Of a business owner, or his conflictive and thieving
attorney, which, the owner or his counsel, have last rights in
directing the matters of the owners business?

5

Answer:
Defendant objects to this interrogatory that it is not
within the scope of discovery, is vague, overbroad, speculative and
calls

for

a hypothetical

response•

Additionally, plaintiff

requests the defendant to render a legal opinion.
Interrogatory No. 29:
In

the

control

of

a

business, without

consent

or

knowledge of the existing board of directors, can outside parties
elect themselves as the board of directors, make and issue company
stock to themselves, then record themselves as being the lawful
board of directors and owners of the business?
Answer:
Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the basis that
it is vague, speculative and calls for a legal conclusion. Without
waiving said objection defendant states that such action would
appear to be a violation of statute.
Interrogatory No. 30:
Is the policy of defendant director Peter Van Alstyne to
allow fraudulent thieving business takeovers by the method above
and by the means the defendant director Peter Van Alstyne has been
allowing to Mouritsen,, McSweeney, and Sampson? (sic)

6

Answer:
Defendant objects to Interrogatory 30 on the basis of
Plaintiff's scurrilous and argumentative statements.

Defendant

further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is
speculative calls for a hypothetical response, and is vague and
overbroad.
Interrogatory No. 31:
Instead of aiding one side or interfering with the other,
would it not be better, even more legal, for the defendant's office
of corporations to not take sides, not change filings, and allow
conflicting parties to settle their differences in a court of law?
Answer:
Defendant objects to this Interrogatory 31 on the grounds
that

the

question

is

speculative, calls

for a

hypothetical

response, is not within the scope of the Rules of Discovery and
furthermore calls for a legal conclusion.
Interrogatory No. 32:
In the immediate matter, has not the defendant director
Van Alstyne taken sides with plaintiff's conflictive attorney
making

defendant

additionally

liable

for plaintiff's

losses?

Defendant's position needs to be declared and justified by its law.

7

Answer:
Defendant

objects

to

the

assertion

in

Plaintiff's

interrogatory that the State has taken sides in any conflict
between Plaintiff and his attorney.

Defendant further objects on

the basis that this questions is vague, speculative and calls for
a legal conclusion^.
Interrogatory No. 33;
Copies of plaintiff's

filings bearing the approving

signature of their filings are included.

Defendant Van Alstyne's

position needs to be declared and justified by its law as to
plaintiff's rights and the current status of his filings.
Answer:
Interrogatory 33 does not appear to be a question.
Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is
not within the scope of discovery under Rule 26 Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence and calls for a legal conclusion.
DATED this \Q

day of August, 1990.

Attorney General
R. .Fau/T^an Dam

~ ^
y

, ( M A ! // /

Melissa M. Hubbell
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
Peter Van Alstyne

Respectfully submitted,
STATE QF, U;

Peter Van Alstyne
Director
Division of Corporations

